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AB S TRACT. Between 1987 and 2005, federal judges sentenced defendants pursuant to
binding Sentencing Guidelines that severely curtailed their discretion. In United States v. Booker,
the Supreme Court held the mandatory Guidelines sentencing scheme unconstitutional and
rendered the Guidelines advisory. This Note offers a picture of white-collar sentencing in
"shades of gray." It conducts an empirical analysis of sentencing decisions after Booker to assess
the consequences of the return to judicial discretion. In particular, the Note examines major
white-collar cases in the Southern District of New York, where many such cases of national and
international significance are prosecuted. The Guidelines instruct judges in white-collar cases to
calculate the amount of economic loss attributable to the defendant and apply a sentencing
enhancement-often a sizable one-on the basis of that loss. The findings reveal that a
significant majority of defendants in these cases receive sentences of imprisonment shorter than
those recommended by the Guidelines. Moreover, when judges impose sentences below the
Guidelines range, the resulting sentences are often dramatically shorter than those produced
under the Guidelines. Based on these findings, this Note argues that the U.S. Sentencing
Commission should revise its approach to white-collar cases in three ways. The Commission
should amend the Guidelines to reduce the severity of the economic loss table; calculate
economic "loss" differently; and add additional, though less severe, enhancements to punish
pecuniary gain and intended loss. Absent such changes, judges will-and should-continue
imposing sentences far below the Guidelines range. These proposed changes better capture the
seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the offender, even if they do not resolve the
fundamental tension between individualized sentencing and the rigid quantification that
characterizes the Guidelines system.
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INTRODUCTION
Between 2000 and 2002, Jamie Olis, his boss Gene Foster, and his
colleague Helen Sharkey orchestrated an illegal transaction at Dynegy
Corporation.' The transaction would appear to Dynegy's auditors and
investors as if it produced income, but it was actually a loan in disguise.' All
three were indicted on charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud,
as well as conspiracy to commit those offenses.' Olis was convicted on all
counts and sentenced to 292 months, or more than twenty-four years in
prison.4 In contrast, Foster and Sharkey cooperated with the government,
testified at Olis's trial, and pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count in exchange
for maximum sentences of five years.s
The conspiracy, titled "Project Alpha," sought to increase the value of
Dynegy's stock; it was "not [meant] to defraud Dynegy or to enrich Olis," and
Olis was not meaningfully enriched as a result.6 Although Olis helped plan the
conspiracy, he did not have the authority to approve the project and did not
draft the key documents.
So why did Olis receive such a long sentence? Prior to the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), judges exercised discretion in sentencing. But at
the time of Olis's original sentencing, the federal Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines) required judges to impose a sentence within a particular range.8
To determine the Guidelines range in white-collar cases, judges considered a
set of enhancements that are commonly referred to as the economic loss table,
which forms part of the Guidelines for white-collar crimes.9 The loss table
increases a defendant's "Offense Level" based on the amount of economic
1. United States v. Olis (Olis 1), 429 F-3d 540, 542, S44 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Olis
(Ois II), No. H-03-217-ol, 20o6 WL 2716048, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006).
2. Ols II, 20o6 WL 2716048, at *12.
3. Id. at *1.
4. Olis I, 429 F.3d at 541-42. Even with "good time," Olis would have had to serve eighty-five
percent of this sentence, or over twenty years.
s. Id. at 542; Ohs II, 20o6 WL 2716048, at *1, *13.
6. Ohs II, 20o6 WL 2716048, at *12.
7. Id.
8. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005) ("In most cases, as a matter of law, the
[Sentencing] Commission will have adequately taken all relevant factors into account, and
no departure will be legally permissible. In those instances, the judge is bound to impose a
sentence within the Guidelines range."). For further discussion of judicial power to depart
from the Guidelines sentencing range prior to Booker, see infra notes 50-59 and
accompanying text.
9. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 231.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
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"loss" attributed to the scheme in which he participated. The Guidelines define
what constitutes "loss" -for instance, clarifying that "loss" means the greater of
actual or intended loss, and that "actual loss" means "the reasonably
foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense."o The Guidelines
then establish the sentencing range based on a combination of the offense level
and the defendant's criminal history."
In Olis's case, the loss table provided for a 26-level increase in Olis's offense
level, which transformed a 15-21 month sentence into a sentence of 292-365
months. Olis appealed his original sentence." While his appeal was pending,
the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker." The landmark case held
unconstitutional the two provisions in the SRA that made the Guidelines
mandatory." In a remedial opinion, the Court severed and excised those two
provisions, rendering the Guidelines effectively advisory.'6 On remand in Olis's
case, the judge calculated a Guidelines range of 151-188 months," or about
twelve to sixteen years.'" Twenty-four points of Olis's 34-point offense level
derived from the "Intended Loss" to the United States Treasury of $79 million,
the entirety of which was attributed to him for sentencing purposes.19
Were it not for the Supreme Court's decision in Booker-which returned
significant discretion in sentencing to federal judges - Olis would have received
a sentence of between twelve and sixteen years. But instead, the judge imposed
1o. See id. cmt. n.3.
ii. See Sentencing Table, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION (2014), http://www.ussc.gov
/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manuaV2014/2014sentencing-table.pdf [http://perma.cc
/4 AT7-YHMG]. Sentences are calculated by the Guidelines using a table, one axis of which
includes the defendant's "Criminal History Category," and the other of which includes the
defendant's "Offense Level." For further discussion of the way the Guidelines operate, see
infra Section L.A and Section I.B.
12. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 2i.i (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014); see
also id. ch. 5, pt. A.
13. See Olis I, 429 F. 3d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 2005).
14. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
15. See id. at 227 (2005); see also Olis I, 429 F.3d at 541 (affirming Olis's conviction, but vacating
and remanding for resentencing).
16. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
17. The recalculated Guidelines range was less severe than the original Guidelines range for
reasons unrelated to the Court's opinion in Booker. See Olis II, No. H-o3-217-oI, 20o6 WL
2716048, at *3-11 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 20o6).
is. Id. at *10. The discrepancy between the original Guidelines sentence imposed (292 months)
and the recalculated Guidelines sentencing range resulted from the sentencing judge's
determination that the amount of loss attributable to Olis was $79 million, not the $105
million originally attributed to him. See id. at *i n.1, *10.
19. See id. at *2-10.
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a "non-Guidelines sentence" of seventy-two months in prison.' Using his
newly authorized discretion, the judge took several factors into account:
(i) Olis did not have the authority to approve Project Alpha, (2) Olis did not
defraud Dynegy and was not enriched in any significant way by the scheme,
(3) Dynegy was not forced to file for bankruptcy, and (4) Olis was born in
Korea, was raised by a single mother in the United States, and had no criminal
history.' To Olis, the discretion afforded to his sentencing judge by Booker
meant the difference between a six-year sentence and a twelve- to sixteen-year
sentence.
Olis's story is noteworthy for two reasons. First, his case illustrates-in
dramatic fashion-how the loss table severely punishes even low-level white-
collar offenders by ratcheting up defendants' offense levels based on the
amount of loss attributed to them. Second, the case demonstrates how Booker
freed up sentencing judges to use their discretion to consider the
appropriateness of applying such severe enhancements where those
enhancements do not serve as accurate proxies for culpability.
Although Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory,. they remain "the
starting point and the initial benchmark" in federal sentencing.2 Judges must
"begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable
Guidelines range."' So getting the Guidelines right still matters. Although
judges may refuse to impose that Guidelines-range sentence, a significant body
of scholarship suggests that the Guidelines act as an "anchor" for federal judges
in that " [c] omputing the advisory Guideline range so early in the sentencing
process strongly anchors a judge's sentence to that range, or close to it."'
Moreover, studies suggest that "the 'anchor' produces an effect on judgment or
assessment even when the anchor is incomplete, inaccurate, irrelevant,
implausible, or random."' Beginning the sentencing inquiry by calculating the
Guidelines range "creates a kind of psychological presumption from which
20. Id. at *13.
21. See id. at *12-13.
22. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 48, 49 (2007).
23. Id.
24. Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive "Anchoring Effect" and "Blind Spot" Biases in Federal
Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 492-93 (2014); see also Daniel M. Isaacs, Note, Baseline Framing in
Sentencing, 121 YALE L.J. 426, 439-41 (2011) (reviewing prior scholarship showing that
"anchoring has a robust and pervasive effect on judicial decisionmaking, including
sentencing").
25. Bennett, supra note 24, at 495.
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most judges are hesitant to deviate too far." This presumption "operates with
particular vengeance in white-collar cases because, at the behest of Congress,
the Sentencing Commission (Commission) has steadily increased the severity
of the white-collar Guidelines . . . ."' Judge Jed Rakoff further explains why
judges might still follow the Guidelines or deviate only modestly from them:
"[F]irst, it is the path of least resistance: the parties come with a stipulated
Guidelines range, the judge can adopt the presentence report's factual findings,
and if the judge gives a Guidelines sentence, it is virtually immune from any
reversal on appeal-it's the easier way to proceed."8 Second, imposing a
Guidelines sentence "permits the judge to avoid the difficult moral questions
that sentencing inevitably presents."' Finally, there are "increasingly few
judges who have ever had any sentencing experience except under a Guidelines
regime."3o
As such, if the white-collar Guidelines are arbitrary or too severe, many
defendants will receive sentences that are arbitrary or too severe. The federal
statute governing sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), requires district judges to
"impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes of" sentencing, which include the "nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant" and "the need for
the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense," and to
promote general and specific deterrence.3 ' To the extent that the Guidelines
counsel a sentencing judge to impose a sentence that is "greater than necessary"
to comply with the purposes of sentencing, those Guidelines run counter to
Congress's directive-even if they are no longer binding.' It remains essential,
then, that the Commission amend the ill-conceived Guidelines.
Although the existing scholarship on the Guidelines acknowledges that the
loss table often produces overly harsh sentences in white-collar cases," it






31. 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(1)-(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Throwing Away the Key, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 279, 280 (2007)
(describing how reliance on "economic loss," as defined in the Guidelines, can result in
"exorbitant sentences" for white-collar defendants); Andrew Weissmann & Joshua A. Block,
White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar Crimes, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 286, 286
(2007) ("Even when a corporate leader has engaged in massive fraud affecting thousands of
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provides no answer to the crucial empirical question: in the post-Booker era,
what sentences do judges actually impose in cases where loss table
enhancements dramatically increase the Guidelines sentencing range? More
specifically, how frequently and to what extent do judges depart from the
sentencing ranges recommended by the Guidelines in high-loss white-collar
cases? The Commission publishes data on aggregate trends in white-collar
sentencing, including the frequency with which judges vary from the
Guidelines sentencing range. At present, however, no one has aggregated and
analyzed that data to determine the extent to which judges' sentences fall below
the Guidelines range. This Note begins to fill that gap.
Part I describes how the Guidelines work, and how the Supreme Court's
decision in Booker changed the sentencing landscape. Post-Booker, sentencing
judges must still begin by correctly calculating the Guidelines sentencing
range, but may, in their discretion, ultimately impose a sentence longer or
shorter than that range.
Against this backdrop, Part II and Part III present my methodology and
empirical results. The empirical analysis considers the frequency with which
judges depart from the Guidelines, and the extent of those departures, in major
white-collar cases in the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.). I also
suggest possible explanations for the trends I identify. Those explanations
consider the role and behavior not only of defendants and judges, but also of
the U.S. Attorney's Office for S.D.N.Y.
First, I analyze how frequently judges depart from the Guidelines-
calculated sentencing range before and after Booker in major white-collar
cases-in other words, how often they impose "below-range sentences." I
examine how frequently different kinds of downward departures occur, and
how the frequency of non-Guidelines sentences depends upon the loss amount
attributed to the defendant. I consider two types of departures. Government-
sponsored departures, which are based on cooperation with the government,
were available before Booker and produce what I refer to as "government-
sponsored below-range sentences."' In contrast, non-government-sponsored
departures became far more common after Booker and produce what I refer to
as "non-government-sponsored below-range sentences." I find that, following
Booker, the rate at which judges impose government-sponsored below-range
sentences has remained about the same. Strikingly, however, the rate at
which judges impose non-government-sponsored below-range sentences has
people . . . sentences of twenty or more years hardly seem necessary to satisfy the traditional
sentencing goals of specific and general deterrence-or even retribution.").
34. Although there are other kinds of "government-sponsored below-range sentences," almost
all such sentences in S.D.N.Y. are based on substantial assistance. For more information, see
infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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increased dramatically. As a result, a significant majority of defendants in
major white-collar cases today receive sentences shorter than the Guidelines
range.
Second, I analyze the extent of the downward departures received by
defendants in major white-collar cases. I use data provided by the Commission
to calculate how great a departure defendants received, if they received one. As
above, I analyze these patterns over time and across departure type. I find that
when defendants receive sentences below the Guidelines range, the sentences
received are, for the most part, significantly shorter than the Guidelines range.
Building on the empirical findings presented in Part III, Part IV of this
Note presents several interrelated normative claims. First, my findings
empirically corroborate scholarly criticism that the loss table often vastly
overstates the seriousness of an offense. This critique is neither unique to a
small number of cases nor embraced by only a few judges. That judges in
S.D.N.Y., who have significant sentencing experience in major white-collar
cases, find the Guidelines sentencing range inappropriate in the significant
majority of such cases suggests that the white-collar Guidelines are flawed.
Second, I argue that because the Guidelines remain the starting point in every
sentencing and may create an "anchoring effect," it is essential to amend the
flawed Guidelines. Amendments to the white-collar Guidelines that took effect
in November 2015 (the 2015 Amendments) improve on the status quo, but they
do not go far enough in changing the means of assessing culpability.5
Accordingly, I argue that the Commission should amend the Guidelines for
white-collar crimes to deemphasize the amount of paper loss and consider
more heavily the defendant's role in the offense, including any pecuniary gain
received. The Commission should reduce the severity of the loss table and
define loss to cover only actual, as opposed to intended, financial losses. The
Commission should propose additional enhancements to capture culpable
conduct that the current Guidelines do not adequately reflect. Unless the
Guidelines accurately capture the culpability of defendants in major white-
collar cases, judges will and should continue to give little weight to the often-
too-severe sentencing ranges produced by those Guidelines. I conclude that
white-collar cases are not amenable to the kind of rigid quantification that
characterizes the entire Guidelines system -a critique that is not confined to
white-collar crime.
3S. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION (Apr. 30,
2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/official-text-amend
ments/2015o43o Amendments.pdf [http://perma.cc/KNB8-XHAH]. For further discussion
of the 2015 Amendments, see infra Section I.D.
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1. FROM JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO MANDATORY GUIDELINES AND
BACK AGAIN: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
A. The Advent of the Sentencing Guidelines and the Mandatory Regime
Before 1984, federal sentencing was simultaneously simple and opaque. A
judge could impose a sentence of any length-or none at all-"up to the
maximums established in the statute defining the crime.",6 Judges were not
required to consider any particular circumstances, nor were they required to
explain their reasons for imposing a particular sentence.
The SRA radically altered this system by establishing binding Guidelines
that greatly reduced judicial discretion. In enacting the SRA, Congress sought
to reduce "unwarranted" disparities in sentencing." Congress passed the
statute on the heels of a short yet influential book by Judge Marvin Frankel,
Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, published in 1973. Judge Frankel
argued that unfettered judicial discretion in sentencing produced arbitrary
outcomes whereby defendants who committed similar crimes received vastly
different sentences. Frankel argued for the establishment of "an administrative
sentencing commission 'of prestige and credibility,' 39 which could create a
"detailed chart or calculus" that would weigh the "many elements that go into
the sentence"4o and provide the judge with a narrow sentencing range from
which the judge would choose a specific sentence.4'
The SRA amended the federal sentencing process in several ways. Among
other changes, it created the United States Sentencing Commission, an
independent agency in the judicial branch. The SRA instructed the
Commission to promulgate the Guidelines, which would become binding on
sentencing judges with very few exceptions.' And the SRA provided the
36. See DANIEL C. RICHMAN ET AL., DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 661 (2014).
37. See id.
38. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38-65 (1983).
39. KATE STITH & JOst A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 36 (1998) (quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAw
WITHOUT ORDER 119 (1973)).
4o. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES, supra note 39, at 113.
41. Id. Frankel's book focused almost exclusively on the problem of sentencing disparities rather
than on the problem of too harsh (or too lenient) sentences. In fact, a series of compromises
made in order to garner Republican support resulted in a provision of the SRA that directed
the Commission to increase penalties for violent and white-collar crimes. See RICHMAN ET
AL., supra note 36, at 669; STITH & CABRANES, supra note 39, at 39-48.
42. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 39, at 1-2.
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government and defendants the right to appeal a sentence on the basis that the
judge did not comply with the Guidelines.'
The first iteration of the Guidelines promulgated by the Commission went
into effect on November 1, 1987. The centerpiece of the Guidelines is the
Sentencing Table, a grid consisting of 258 different sentencing ranges." The
Sentencing Table's horizontal axis tracks the defendant's "Criminal History
Category," which is adjusted based on his criminal history as defined in the
Guidelines.45 A defendant's criminal history category can range from I to VI.46
The vertical axis tracks "Offense Level," which is determined by starting with a
"base offense level" for the crime committed and then adjusting for a variety of
"specific offense characteristics" that the Guidelines deems relevant, and may
be between one and forty-three points.47 The portion of the Sentencing Table
where the defendant's criminal history category and offense level intersect
represents the defendant's Guidelines sentencing range.48 That range is quite
narrow: its maximum "cannot exceed the minimum by more than the greater
of' either twenty-five percent or six months.49
Under the pre-Booker Guidelines, the vast majority of sentences imposed
fell within the Guidelines range.so But even before Booker, there were two
means by which a judge could impose a sentence outside that range.s" First, a
court could impose a non-Guidelines sentence if "the court finds that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission . . . ."s I
refer to these sentences as "Guidelines-sanctioned departures." Before Booker,
Guidelines-sanctioned departures were almost always departures below the
43. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 51-52.
44. See U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note 11.
45. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 IB.I(a)(6) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
46. See U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note ii.
47. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1I1.1(a)(2)-(4) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014); U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note ii.
48. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 111.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
49. Id. ch. 1, pt. A(1) (4) (h).
50. For instance, in 2002, 74.5% of all sentences imposed were within the Guidelines
range in S.D.N.Y. 2002 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, U.S.
SENT'G COMMISSION 53 tbl.26 (2002), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research
-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2002/table26.pdf [http://perma.cc/QP
G9 -ZUH3].
si. In this Note, I use the term "non-Guidelines sentence" to refer to any sentence imposed that
is not within the Guidelines-calculated range as determined by the sentencing judge. A non-
Guidelines sentence could either exceed or fall short of the Guidelines sentencing range.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3 5 53(b)(1) (2012).
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Guidelines range, and they "occurred in fewer than io percent of cases"
nationwide." The second, more common route of departure occurred when
prosecutors filed a "substantial assistance motion" pursuant to section 5K1.1 of
the Guidelines. The government may file such a motion, which "stat[es] that
the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense," and which
authorizes judges to depart from the Guidelines sentencing range.' During the
period when the Guidelines were "mandatory," courts imposed such
departures in fifteen to twenty percent of cases nationwide.5
While some prominent scholars argue that Congress did not intend for the
SRA to eliminate judges' discretion to impose individualized sentences,s" the
Supreme Court disagreed. This more restrictive reading of the SRA
contemplated a "mandatory" sentencing regime with minimal judicial
discretion to depart from the Guidelines. In 1992, the Supreme Court held in
Williams v. United States that a court's use of a ground for departure that was
prohibited by the Guidelines' "policy statements" was an incorrect application
of the Guidelines and constituted reversible error.' One year later, the Court
held that the Guidelines' policy statements were binding on federal courts, and
that the Commission's commentary must be "given controlling weight unless it
is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the [statute]."ss Thus, before Booker,
53. See RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 670.
54. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014). While
these kinds of sentences are "government-sponsored," the judge still decides the length of
each defendant's sentence.
55. See RICHMAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 670.
56. Amy Baron-Evans and Kate Stith argue that rather than significantly restricting judges'
sentencing discretion, the SRA anticipated that judges would retain broad authority to
depart from the Guidelines:
The judge would first consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the
history and characteristics of the defendant, and the purposes of sentencing, as
required by § 3553(a). This consideration would inform the judge's decision as to
whether the guideline range adequately reflected the circumstances of the case
and whether a different sentence should result, as required by § 3553(b). The
judge would then determine the guideline range, and either sentence within the
guideline range because it appropriately reflected the relevant factors, or sentence
outside the guideline range because it did not.
Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 16o U. PA. L. REv. 1631, 1647-48 (2012)
(emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
57. 503 U.S. 193, 200 (1992).
58. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). In addition to the Guidelines, Congress authorized the
Commission to promulgate "policy statements" regarding, among other things, the
1028
125:10o18 2016
FIFTY SHADES OF GRAY: SENTENCING TRENDS IN MAJOR WHITE-COLLAR CASES
sentencing judges' ability to depart from the Guidelines-calculated sentence
was quite limited.59
B. Booker and Its Progeny: A Return to Judicial Discretion in Sentencing
A series of decisions on the constitutionality of the Guidelines culminated
in 2005 with Booker.6o In Booker, the Court invalidated the provisions of the
SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory.6' The Court found the binding
Guidelines scheme unconstitutional because it increased sentences on the basis
of judicial fact finding rather than fact finding by a jury. The fix, the Court
concluded, was simply to render the Guidelines advisory.
Since Booker, federal judges must begin by accurately calculating the
Guidelines sentencing range, but may choose to depart from that range. The
Court later clarified in Gall v. United States that the standard of review for such
sentences is reasonableness, meaning abuse of discretion, regardless of whether
the sentence falls within or outside the Guidelines range. If the judge imposes
a non-Guidelines sentence, the reasonableness tandard applies regardless of
the extent to which that sentence departs from the Guidelines range.
Appellate courts may apply a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to
Guidelines sentences, 6 but may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness to
non-Guidelines sentences.
"application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing." 28 U.S.C. 5 994(a)(2)
(2012).
s9. Although, as discussed, limited means of departing from the Guidelines sentencing range
were available prior to Booker, for convenience I refer to the pre-Booker regime as
"mandatory."
6o. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
61. Id. at 227; see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 312-14 (2004) (holding Washington
State's sentencing-guideline system unconstitutional and requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt for any fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction or one admitted by
the defendant) that increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum); Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000) (holding five-four that a statutory hate crime enhancement
that increased the statutory maximum was functionally equivalent o an element of a greater
offense and, therefore, facts establishing a hate crime should have been submitted to the
jury).
62. 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
63. Id. at 47 ("We reject, however, an appellate rule that requires 'extraordinary' circumstances
to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range. We also reject the use of a rigid
mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for
determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence.").
64. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
6s. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 47.
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While the sentencing judge must always use the correctly calculated
Guidelines range as her starting point, she may impose a non-Guidelines
sentence if she finds that deviating is necessary to "impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to comply with the sentencing
factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), discussed in Section I.A.66 The Court's
"resounding overall message [post-Booker] is clear: Booker did indeed
transform the Federal Sentencing Guidelines from 'law' to a lesser species, a
form of quasi-law. Using the Court's terminology, the Guidelines are 'advice'
that yield sentences that . .. can in most cases be judged 'reasonable."-6 ,
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the percentage of non-Guidelines sentences
imposed has increased in the wake of Booker and its progeny.
Figure i.












2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Within Range (Guidelines Sentence)
- - -- Government-Sponsored Below-Range (5Ki.1)
Non-Government-Sponsored Below-Range
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007)
(discussing the sentencing judge's role in weighing § 3553(a) factors to reach a non-
Guidelines sentence).
67. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise ofDiscretion, 117 YALE
L.J. 1420, 1492 (2o8).
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As depicted in Figure i, after Booker, the percentage of cases in which
judges imposed a Guidelines sentence fell consistently, while the percentage of
non-government-sponsored below-range sentences teadily increased. By 2012,
the percentage of "within-range" Guidelines sentences had fallen to just over
52%. 68
C. The Economic Loss Table
As discussed in Section I.A, judges calculate a defendant's Guidelines
sentencing range by first determining the defendant's criminal history category
and the applicable offense level, and then identifying the relevant sentencing
range from the Sentencing Table.6 ' The base offense level for most economic
crimes, such as larceny and fraud, is either six or seven levels.7 o The Guidelines
include a multitude of factors that can result in enhancements to the offense
level for these crimes. For instance, if the offense involved ten or more victims,
two levels are added; if the offense involved receiving stolen property, and the
defendant was a person in the business of receiving and selling stolen property,
two levels are added; if the offense involved "a misrepresentation that the
defendant was acting on behalf of a [religious] organization," two levels are
added.'
Still other enhancements are transsubstantive in that they apply across all
types of offenses - not just the financial crimes covered by section 2B1.1. For
instance, if the defendant was an "organizer or leader of criminal activity that
involved five or more participants," four levels are added.' The most
significant of these transsubstantive enhancements is the concept of "relevant
conduct," explained in the commentary of section 1B1.1 of the Guidelines. The
definition of "offense" includes "the offense of conviction and all relevant
conduct under section IB1.3."' Under section 1B1.3, "relevant conduct" includes
not just the defendant's offense of conviction, but all criminal activity that
"occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation
for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
68. See Figure 1.
69. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
70. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2131.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
71. Id. § 2_Bi.i(b) (2) (B), (b) (4), (b) (9).
72. Id. § 3131.1(a).
73. Id. § iBi.1 cmt. 1(H) (emphasis added). For background on the relevant conduct provision
of the Guidelines, see William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The
Cornerstone ofthe Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495 (1990).
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responsibility for that offense."' When a judge determines whether a
particular enhancement should apply, then, she must consider not only
conduct related to the defendant's offense of conviction, but also any criminal
conduct not charged-even criminal conduct of which the defendant was
acquitted-if she determines by a preponderance of the evidence that such
conduct occurred.7s The Guidelines also import the Pinkerton doctrine for
sentencing purposes76: the relevant conduct provision makes the defendant
responsible for all crimes of his coconspirators if those acts were "reasonably
foreseeable" to him.'
By far the most severe enhancement applicable to white-collar offenders is
section 2B1.1(b), also known as the loss table, which provides offense level
enhancements on the basis of the amount of loss attributed to the defendant.
For example, if the loss exceeded $30,000, six levels are added; if the loss
exceeded $2,500,000, eighteen levels are added.7 The rationale behind the loss
table enhancements is simple: as the amount of economic loss caused by the
defendant's crime increases, so does the seriousness of the crime and the
defendant's culpability.
But the loss table frequently produces arbitrary and unduly severe
sentences for two related reasons. First, the loss attributable to the defendant is
defined so broadly that it can produce lifelong sentencing ranges for
defendants who neither cause much economic harm nor derive much economic
benefit from their crimes. Amendments made to the Guidelines in 200179
74. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(i) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
75. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 148 (1997) (holding that a defendant convicted of
possessing cocaine base with intent to distribute, but acquitted of using a firearm in relation
to a drug offense, may still be given a higher sentence where the sentencing judge found by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant in fact possessed the gun).
76. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946). Consider, for example, a
defendant whom prosecutors charge as a co-conspirator in a drug conspiracy. Say the jury
acquits the defendant on the conspiracy charge: that is, the jury refuses to make the
defendant criminally liable for crimes committed by others in the conspiracy. Even in this
circumstance, the sentencing judge would be required by the Guidelines to attribute those
other crimes to the defendant if the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the
co-conspirators' criminal activity was in fact reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB1.3(a)(1)(B) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
78. Id. 5 2B1.1(b)(1)(D), (J). On November 1, 2015, a round of amendments to the loss table
took effect, slightly altering the amount of loss that triggers each enhancement. For
instance, the amount of loss that triggers a 2-level enhancement increased from more than
$5,000 to more than $6,500. These amendments are meant to account for inflation. See U.S.
SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 15-24.





FIFTY SHADES OF GRAY: SENTENCING TRENDS IN MAJOR WHITE-COLLAR CASES
modified the relevant definition of "loss," which is now defined as the
"reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense."so
Pecuniary harm, in turn, is the greater of the "actual loss" or the "intended
loss" (the harm that was intended to result from the offense)."
Consider a defendant who intended to cause a loss of $1.5 million, but
whose conduct did not cause any loss at all. He could receive the same
enhancement - sixteen levels - as a defendant whose conduct actually resulted
in a loss of $1.5 million.' The actual loss includes all "reasonably foreseeable
pecuniary harm," or the harm "that the defendant knew or, under the
circumstances, reasonably should have known, was a potential result of the
offense."3 So the amount of loss attributed to the defendant could either be a
real amount (the actual loss) or a hypothetical amount (the intended loss), and
may or may not have been foreseen by the defendant. Finally, the relevant loss
could accrue to almost any individual or entity, or any group of individuals or
entities, including the government and financial institutions.4 For example,
the amount ultimately attributed to Olis was $79 million, which was the loss in
tax revenue to the United States Treasury that he intended to cause."s The way
that "loss" is calculated under the Guidelines -by aggregating the total amount
of loss caused (or intended to be caused) to any victim of the offense, and
attributing that entire loss amount to the defendant and any co-conspirators -
ensures that many defendants subject to loss table enhancements will receive
extremely harsh Guidelines sentences. As the Second Circuit noted, "[It may
well be that all but the most trivial frauds in publicly traded companies may
trigger [Guidelines] sentences amounting to life imprisonment."6
Second, the loss table's enhancements are so large that, in practice, they
dwarf other potentially more relevant considerations. The loss table provides
for enhancements ranging from two levels (for a loss of more than $5,000) to
thirty levels (for a loss of more than $400 million).8' In contrast, an "organizer
so. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014); see also Office of Gen. Counsel, Loss Primer (52B1.1(b)(1)), U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION
1 (2013), http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Primers/PrimerLoss.pdf [http://perma.cc/2LQF
-5EMW] (noting that the Commission "modified the definition of loss such that it would be
based on reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm and would include intended loss").
81. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 2Bi.1 cmt. n.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
82. See id. § 2Bi.1(b)(1).
83. Id. § 2B1.i cmt. n.3 (emphasis added).
84. See id. § 2Bi.1(b).
85. See Olis II, No. H-o3-217-o, 20o6 WL 2716048, at *1o (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 20o6).
86. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006).
87. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
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or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants" receives only
a four-level enhancement and a "manager or supervisor" of the criminal
activity receives a three-level enhancement, while a "minimal" participant
receives a four-level reduction and a "minor" participant receives a two-level
reduction." The loss table enhancements can overwhelm other factors that are
arguably more relevant to the defendant's culpability, including his role in the
offense, his criminal history, and the economic benefit he received.
D. The 2015Amendments
In addition to promulgating the Guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary, the Commission periodically reviews and proposes amendments
to the Guidelines to Congress. On November 1, 2015, a new round of
amendments took effect, several of which implicate white-collar sentencing.89
One change clarified the term "intended loss" by changing the definition
from "the pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense" to "the
pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to inflict."9 o This
amendment settled a circuit split over whether a subjective or objective test
should be applied when calculating intended loss,9' favoring the subjective
test." The Commission explained that this amendment "recognizes that
sentencing enhancements predicated on intended loss, rather than losses that
have actually accrued, should focus more specifically on the defendant's
culpability."" Note, however, that this amendment does not affect how
severely intended loss, as opposed to actual loss, is punished. As long as the
defendant purposely sought to inflict a particular amount of pecuniary harm,
he will receive the same enhancement under the loss table as a defendant who
actually caused such losses to accrue. And intended loss still "includes intended
pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur."94
as. Id. 5 3B1.1-2.
8. See U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 1.
go. Id. at 28.
g. Compare, e.g., United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048, 1048 (ioth Cit. 2011) (holding that a
subjective inquiry into the defendant's purpose is required), with United States v. Innarelli,
524 F. 3d 286, 291 (ist Cir. 20o8) (holding that the loss inquiry should be guided by the
objectively reasonable expectations of a person in the defendant's position).
92. See U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 29.
93. Id.
94. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bi.1 cmt. n.3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014);
see U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 29 (omitting any changes to the definition of
intended loss that would alter this inclusion). Another amendment adds an enhancement of
between 2 and 6 levels based on "substantial financial hardship" to a designated number of
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E. Gaps in the Literature on White-Collar Sentencing
The existing literature acknowledges that the Guidelines can produce
extraordinarily high sentences for white-collar offenders. In particular, scholars
have criticized the Guidelines's emphasis on economic loss for producing
sentences that fail to capture a defendant's true culpability.9 s In criticizing the
Guidelines, authors tend to focus on particular high-profile white-collar cases
in which defendants received extraordinary sentences as examples "that should
cause the Sentencing Commission and Congress to rethink the fraud
Guidelines.",6 As Daniel Richman noted, "[P]erhaps because finding a useful
quantitative metric is difficult, or because stable patterns have yet to emerge,
assessments of the new regime have largely been driven by anecdote and
rhetoric."" Moreover, much of the criticism of the white-collar Guidelines
regime assumes that Guidelines sentences are actually imposed in most cases.98
victims ranging from i or more (2 levels) to 25 or more (6 levels). U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION,
supra note 35, at 26. These enhancements replace those previously applied based on the total
number of victims of the offense without consideration for the hardship suffered by such
victims. Id. The 2015 Amendments also alter the way that loss is calculated in cases involving
fraudulent manipulation of value of a publicly traded security or commodity by removing
the rebuttable presumption in favor of applying the "fraud on the market" theory. Under
this amendment, courts are free to "use any method that is appropriate and practicable
under the circumstances." Id. at 30. Finally, the 2015 Amendments change the enhancement
applicable to "sophisticated means." Id. at 29. The enhancement applicable on the basis of
the use of "sophisticated means" will now apply only if the defendant's own conduct was
sophisticated- not where the offense itself involved sophisticated means. Id.
95. See, e.g., Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just Sentencing
Regime in White-Collar Criminal Cases, 59 DuKE L.J. 1001, 1001 (2010) ("The U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines recommend sentences that are generally too high and place a grossly
disproportionate emphasis on the concept of 'loss' . . . . This concept of loss is ill defined,
and often artificial to the point of being arbitrary. Moreover, the loss calculation fails to
adequately approximate a defendant's culpability, dwarfing traditionally relevant
considerations such as the manner in which the defendant committed the crime and the
defendant's motive for doing so.").
96. Weissmann & Block, supra note 33, at 291; see also, e.g., Podgor, supra note 33, at 279-81
(characterizing the sentences imposed on Bernie Ebbers, John Rigas, Timothy Rigas, and
Jeff Skilling as examples of the deficiency of the current white-collar sentencing regime).
97. Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress, 76
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 60 (2013).
98. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 731, 731-32 (2007) ("White collar offenders have faced sentences far beyond
those imposed in prior years. . . . Although the sentencing guidelines have some flexibility
resulting from the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker, the culture of
mandated guidelines still permeates the structure and, as such, prominently advises the
judiciary." (citations omitted)); see also Vollrath, supra note 95, at 1003 ("Despite [their]
flaws, the Guidelines continue to dominate sentencing. Although the Supreme Court
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To the extent that the literature recognizes the discretion afforded by Booker,99
some scholars assume this discretion will have a limited effect in the area of
white-collar crime; others see increased discretion as particularly well-suited to
white-collar cases.00 While some scholarship considers whether judges should
use their post-Booker discretion to impose below-range sentences in major
white-collar cases, the literature thus far has not considered the extent to which
judges actually mitigate the effects of the Guidelines in major white-collar cases
by imposing below-range sentences. In particular, no empirical study has
explained (i) how often judges impose below-range sentences in major white-
collar cases; or (2) when such sentences are imposed, the extent to which those
sentences are shorter than the Guidelines sentencing range. This Note seeks to
fill that gap.
II. METHODOLOGY
This Part describes the sentencing trend reports published by the
Commission, explains why those reports are insufficient for identifying trends
in major white-collar sentencing, and describes the methodology for my
empirical analysis.
A. The Sentencing Commission's Trend Reports
The Commission releases a limited amount of information on trends in
sentencing."o This includes annual sentencing "trend reports" organized by
rendered the Guidelines no longer mandatory in United States v. Booker, judges still adhere
to the Guidelines with roughly the same frequency as before the Booker decision. A culture
of mandated guidelines continues to permeate the federal sentencing regime." (citations
omitted)).
g. Baron-Evans and Stith offer a comprehensive account of the effects of Booker and its
progeny, arguing that Booker provided the "fix" necessary to change the sentencing process
for the better by allowing a return to individualized sentencing that considers "all relevant
facts about the offense and the offender." Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 56, at 1742.
oo. Compare Daniel A. Chatham, Note, Playing with Post-Booker Fire: The Dangers of Increased
Judicial Discretion in Federal White Collar Sentencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619, 627 (2007) ("[I]t is
probable that most of the downward departures have come in drug cases, as the drug
guidelines are much higher than white collar guidelines and are more universally decried by
district court judges."), with Vollrath, supra note 95, at 1005 (arguing that the increased
discretion afforded to judges by Kimbrough v. United States "can and should apply to the
sentencing of white-collar criminals, allowing judges to move away from the Sentencing
Guidelines' disproportionate emphasis on loss").
in0. See Federal Sentencing Statistics by District, Circuit & State: Geographic Statistics by Fiscal
Year, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/federal
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federal judicial district and circuit that note, for example, the average length of
sentences in that district by crime type compared to national trends.o2
The trend reports, however, are insufficient to analyze meaningfully the
frequency and extent of departures from the Guidelines in major white-collar
cases. First, because the Commission organizes the trend reports by individual
offense types, one must aggregate data for several offense types to analyze, for
example, all white-collar crimes.o3 Second, in cases where the defendant
received a non-Guidelines sentence, the trend reports do not identify the
corresponding Guidelines sentencing range. As a result, the reports do not
indicate how far judges depart from the Guidelines sentencing range when
they impose non-Guidelines sentences.10 4 And the Commission's district-by-
district analysis offers no information on the influence of the loss table on
sentences. Although the Commission recently published data on sentencing
trends for white-collar offenders nationwide, that data does not show how the




103. The Commission has released some analysis of sentencing trends for all "§2B.i Offenders."
See Sentencing and Guideline Application Information for 52B.1 Offenders, U.S. SENT'G
COMMISSION 4 (Sept. 2013), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and
-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/economic-crimes/2o130918-19-symposiunVSen
tencingGuidelineApplication Info.pdf [http://perma.cc/V4H7-66QR]. But this analysis
includes all crimes in which offenders were sentenced under section 2B1.1, regardless of
whether they were subject to any loss-table enhancements. Moreover, the offenses of
conviction are broader than the ones I analyze.
104. The Commission issued a report on the continuing impact of Booker on federal sentencing
in December 2012. This report does include some data analysis of the percentage difference
between the average Guidelines minimum and the sentence imposed in fraud cases over
time. See U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 16 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default
/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-reports/2o12-booker/PartC
1oFraudOffenses.pdf [http://perma.cc/W9NP-496V]. However, the data covers only
fraud offenses and does not include any other white-collar offenses. Finally, the data
includes only the average length of sentences imposed for all fraud cases without
differentiating between the kinds of sentence received (e.g., non-government-sponsored
below-range sentences and government-sponsored below-range sentences).
105. See U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note 103, at 4.
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B. White-Collar Crimes Dataset
The Commission provides raw sentencing data on its website. o6 The raw
data includes information about each defendant sentenced in a particular
district in a given fiscal year. The data includes, for instance, the primary
offense charged, the applicable Guidelines sentencing range, the actual
sentence imposed, and the type of departure imposed, if any."o7
To identify changes in white-collar sentencing trends after Booker, which
was decided in 2005, I reviewed sentencing data for the years 2002 through
2012.1o8 Because I focus on sentencing in major white-collar cases-and in
particular, sentences imposed in cases with very high loss amounts-I used
sentencing data from S.D.N.Y.
By using this data sample, I could ensure that the dataset would include
enough high-loss white-collar cases in each year to analyze reliably.o9
Moreover, because New York is home to many major financial institutions,
many of the biggest white-collar cases are prosecuted in S.D.N.Y. Lastly,
because the behavior of judges and prosecutors varies widely from district to
district, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain national trends."o By
i06. See Commission Datafiles, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov/research-and
-publications/commission-datafiles [http://perma.cc/8WFK-5KA5].
107. See Variable Codebook for Individual Offenders, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/datafiles/Individual
CodebookFY99_FY14 .pdf (http://perma.cc/TC5U-BRYZ].
108. See id. Data for 2013 and 2014 has since been made available.
log. For instance, in fiscal year 2012, there were 304 offenders sentenced for fraud in S.D.N.Y.
Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2012, Southern District of New York, U.S.
SENT'G COMMISSION 2 tbl.i (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research
-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2012/nysl2.pdf [http://
perma.cc/3CAF-ADUV] [hereinafter Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2012, Southern
District of New York]. In the same time period, only 64 offenders were sentenced for the
same offense in the Southern District of Ohio. Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2012,
Southern District of Ohio, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION 2 tbl.1 (2012), http://www.ussc
.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-dis
trict-circuit/2012/ohs12.pdf [http://perma.cc/VM77-RQ8J]. The only other district with
more white-collar cases than S.D.N.Y. is the Southern District of Florida.
Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2012, Southern District of Florida, U.S. SENT'G
COMMIsSION 2 tbl. 1 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and
-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2ol2/flsl2.pdf [http://perma
.cc/9KWL-NFJB] [hereinafter Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2012, Southern
District ofFlorida] (reporting 519 fraud cases).
11o. An example of interdistrict disparities in prosecutorial and judicial behavior: in fiscal year
2012, non-government-sponsored below-range sentences were imposed in 47.5% of cases in
S.D.N.Y., compared with only 17.8% nationally and 23.1% in the Southern District of
Florida. Compare Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2012, Southern District of New York,
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analyzing data only from S.D.N.Y., I am thus able to offer more reliable
possible explanations for my findings. Although below-range sentences are
imposed in a higher percentage of all criminal cases in S.D.N.Y. than the
national average,"' this distinction is irrelevant for purposes of my analysis; my
research focuses on the kinds of sentences imposed in a specific type of case,
and does not address sentencing disparities across jurisdictions. Accordingly,
my results and analysis apply only to major white-collar cases in S.D.N.Y.
I analyzed the raw data using SPSS software to isolate and evaluate "major
white-collar cases." To identify the subset of cases I classify as "major white-
collar cases," I eliminated the sentencing data for all non-white-collar crimes.
This left sentences imposed for fraud, embezzlement, bribery, tax offenses, and
antitrust violations."' Second, to exclude offenses related to drug or organized
crime from my dataset, I eliminated any sentences in which the defendant was
also convicted of a weapons-related offense. Finally, to focus on only "major"
white-collar cases, I eliminated all sentencing data for offenses where the loss
amount attributed to the defendant was $30,000 or less. Accordingly, I use the
term "major white-collar cases" to refer to this particular subset of offenses."'
Examining a very particular subset of offenses offers a more nuanced view
of how judges have utilized the discretion afforded by Booker. It yields a picture
of major white-collar sentencing that considers "shades of gray." Whereas the
Commission's trend reports paint in broad strokes, my findings provide as-yet-
unavailable information about sentencing trends in high-loss white-collar cases
in particular. My findings supplement the information provided by the
Commission by filling the gaps identified in Section I.E.
supra note 109, at 11 tbl.8, with Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2012, Southern
District ofFlorida, supra note lo9, at 11 tbl.8.
im. In fiscal year 2012, 52.4% of cases were sentenced within the Guidelines range nationally. In
S.D.N.Y. for the same time period, only 33.5% of cases were sentenced within the Guidelines
range. See Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2012, Southern District of New York, supra
note 1o9, at 11 tbl.8.
112. This allowed me to draw conclusions about sentencing trends in major white-collar cases
generally rather than specific offenses in particular. By comparison, the Commission's
published reports generally provide analysis on an offense-by-offense basis. See, e.g., U.S.
SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note io6.
113. Although there are reasons to believe that the loss table could also overstate the culpability
of defendants with less than $30,000 of loss attributed to them, my concern here is with
defendants whose offense levels are subject to significant enhancement on the basis of the
loss table.
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS: SENTENCING IN MAJOR WHITE-
COLLAR CASES IN S.D.N.Y.
Section I.B described how the loss table affects sentences in major white-
collar cases by providing for significant enhancements on the basis of broadly
defined economic loss attributed to the defendant. This Part provides a step-
by-step analysis of sentencing trends in these major white-collar cases. Section
III.A illustrates that defendants in these cases often receive a departure from
their Guidelines-calculated sentencing range, and considers how the frequency
of departures changed after Booker. Next, in Section III.B, I consider whether
the likelihood of a defendant receiving such a departure is affected by the
amount of loss attributed to him via the loss table. In Section III.C, I probe
further and determine that the magnitude of such downward departures is
quite sizable. Finally, in Section III.D, I consider whether these results might
be unique to major white-collar cases and determine that they probably are
not.
A. The Decline of Guidelines Sentences: Trends in White-Collar Cases in
S.D.N. Y. and Nationally
Before considering the particular effects of the loss table, I analyze how
white-collar sentencing practices have changed in general since Booker. Figure 2
shows general sentencing trends for major white-collar cases in S.D.N.Y. over
time. Before Booker, Guidelines sentences constituted about seventy percent of
all major white-collar sentences. From 2009 to 2012, however, only about thirty
to forty percent of such sentences fell within the Guidelines range."' In
comparison - based on information provided by the Commission - Guidelines
sentences for all economic crimes tied to the loss table nationwide decreased
from more than eighty percent of sentences before Booker to only 50.6% of
sentences in 2012.115 In other words, judges in S.D.N.Y. apply Guidelines
sentences in major white-collar cases at a rate much lower than the national
average for similar economic crimes (30.4%, compared to So.6% nationally, in
2012) n6
114. See infra Table A2.
115. U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note 103, at 4. Note that the data provided by the
Sentencing Commission for economic crimes nationally includes all crimes listed under
section 2B1.i of the Guidelines, and includes all sentences imposed, including those where
the defendant was not subject to a loss-table enhancement. That is, the offenses included are
broader than the ones I analyzed. As such, the comparisons between national data nd data
in S.D.N.Y. are inexact.
116. Compare id., with infra Table A2.
1040
125: 10o18 2016
FIFTY SHADES OF GRAY: SENTENCING TRENDS IN MAJOR WHITE-COLLAR CASES
Figure 2.
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Figure 2"' also reflects the significant increase in the imposition of non-
government-sponsored below-range sentences in S.D.N.Y. The percentage of
cases in which such sentences were imposed increased from around ten percent
before Booker, to thirty percent just after Booker, to around fifty percent by
117. The category "government-sponsored below-range (5Ki.i)" technically includes other kinds
of government-sponsored below-range sentences, but there were virtually no such sentences
included in my dataset. The Sentencing Commission's Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statistics describes this category as including, but not limited to, departures occurring
"pursuant to a plea agreement ... savings to the government, early plea, deportation, waiver
of indictment and/or appeal, other government motion, global disposition, [or] . . .
stipulations . . . ... See Appendix A: Descriptions of Datafiles, Variables, and Endnotes, in
U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, 2013 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 6
(2013), http://www.ussc.gov/research-and-publications/annual-reports-sourcebooks/2013
/sourcebook-2013 [http://perma.cc/QE9Q-PNs6]. In fiscal year 2012, for example, there
were only 15 "other government sponsored below range" sentences imposed, compared with
246 departures based on section 5K1.1 substantial assistance. See Statistical Information
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2010." Note the dramatic ombined result: by 2012, nearly seventy percent of
defendants in major white-collar cases in S.D.N.Y. received a government-
sponsored or non-government-sponsored below-range sentence."
Nationally, about forty-seven percent of white-collar offenders received
below-range sentences, and about twenty-five percent received non-
government-sponsored below-range sentences." Comparing S.D.N.Y. with
national trends, judges in S.D.N.Y. imposed non-government-sponsored
below-range sentences at a much higher rate (forty-six percent) than the
national average (twenty-five percent). This result is not particularly surprising
given that judges in S.D.N.Y. have consistently departed from the Guidelines
at rates higher than the national average when one considers all crimes, not just
economic ones."' Finally, Figure 2 demonstrates that Booker apparently had
little, if any, effect on the rate at which the government sponsored departures,
which hovered around twenty percent for most years."'
In the wake of Booker, the frequency with which below-range sentences
have been imposed has increased steadily such that, by 2012, a significant
majority of defendants in major white-collar cases in S.D.N.Y. received below-
range sentences. This tells us that judges in S.D.N.Y. are frequently dissatisfied
with the sentencing ranges produced by the Guidelines in major white-collar
cases, as they impose sentences below the Guidelines range in nearly seven in
ten cases. As described further in Part IV, the fact that sentencing judges in
S.D.N.Y. -who have significant experience sentencing in white-collar cases -
depart with such frequency suggests that the white-collar Guidelines fail to
provide tools sufficient to capture defendants' true culpability.
na. The rate of non-government-sponsored below-range sentences has increased nationwide as
well, but it has not increased nearly as dramatically. About 5% of white-collar offenders
received such sentences in the years before Booker, increasing to roughly 13% after Booker in
2005, and increasing further to about 25% by 2012. See U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note
103, at 4.
11g. See also infra Table A2.
12o. See U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note 103, at 4.
121. See, e.g., Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2012, Southern District of New York, supra
note lo9, at ii (showing that in S.D.N.Y., Guidelines sentences were imposed in 33.5% of
cases versus, nationally, in 52.4% of cases).
122. Nationally, government-sponsored below-range sentences became much more popular over
time in white-collar cases, increasing from 9-5% of cases in 2003, to about 22% of cases in
2012. See U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note 103, at 4.
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B. Departures Become More Frequent as Loss Amount Increases, Largely Due to
Changes in the Rate of Government-Sponsored Departures
This Section considers whether the loss amount attributed to the defendant
affects his likelihood of receiving a below-range sentence. As described in
Section I.C, the loss table provides for significant enhancements-up to thirty
levels -in the defendant's offense level. As the loss amount increases, so does
the severity of these enhancements. For example, a defendant who receives a
four-level enhancement under the loss table (for a loss amount greater than
$1o,ooo) might end up with a sentencing range of six to twelve months instead
of zero to six months, whereas one who receives a twenty-four-level
enhancement (for a loss amount greater than $5o million) - as Olis did - may
receive a sentencing range of fifteen to twenty years instead of ten to sixteen
months."'
Moreover, the enhancements might not reflect the defendant's actual
culpability or the true seriousness of the offense. Recall that, under the loss
table, a defendant who intends - but does not actually cause - a particular
amount of loss receives the same enhancement as one who actually causes that
amount of loss. Judges might impose non-government-sponsored below-range
sentences more often in higher-loss cases, where the loss table provides for
severe enhancements.'` My results demonstrate, however, that below-range
sentences are more common in higher-loss cases, but only because the
government is more likely to have sponsored a below-range sentence in higher-
loss cases. I present and explain these results below, and follow with a
discussion of potential explanations.
To analyze departure rates by loss amount, I analyzed the types of
sentences imposed over several different loss categories. I divided sentences
123. See U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION, supra note ii (showing Criminal History Category I, Offense
Levels 6, lo, 12, 36).
124. To understand the rationale for this prediction, consider the following hypothetical: a judge
may agree that, for example, a defendant who commits a fraud resulting in a $1o,ooo loss
has committed an offense that is about 4 levels more severe than a similar offense that
results in a $Soo loss. This judge would be unlikely to disagree with the loss-table-
suggested enhancement of 4 levels -which could turn what would have been a 0-6 month
sentencing range into a 6-12 month sentencing range. See id. (indicating that Criminal
History Category I, Offense Level 6 results in a o-6 month sentencing range and Offense
Level io results in a 6-12 month sentencing range). But that very same judge may hesitate to
impose a 24-level enhancement on a defendant like Jamie Olis based on a loss amount
greater than $50 million, where such an enhancement could turn a sentence of lo-16 months
into a sentence of 15-20 years. See id. (requiring that Criminal History Category I, Offense
Level 12 result in a io-16 month sentencing range, and that Offense Level 36 result in a 188-
235 month sentencing range).
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into four categories based on loss amount: (1) between $30,001 and $200,000;
(2) between $200,001 and $1 million; (3) between $i million and $20 million;
and (4) greater than $20 million.'
Figure 3.
COMPARISON OF GUIDELINES SENTENCES AND NON-GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED










$3oK - $2ooK $20oK - $iM $1M - $20M $20M and up
Loss Amount Attributed to Defendant
Pre-Booker: Guidelines Sentence
0 Pre-Booker Below-Range: Non-Government-Sponsored
mPost-Booker: Guidelines Sentence
63Post-Booker Below-Range: Non-Government-Sponsored
Figure 3 depicts data for Guidelines sentences and non-government-
sponsored below-range sentences over time and by loss amount."' Figure 3
125. I divided sentences into categories broader than those provided for in the loss table in order
to ensure that there would be a sufficient number of cases in each category to analyze
reliably.
126. There were only 18 pre-Booker and 58 post-Booker sentences involving over $20 million in
loss. Moreover, my analysis with respect to the effect of loss amount on sentencing trends is
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shows that, both before and after Booker, the rate at which judges imposed
Guidelines sentences decreased as the loss amount attributed to defendants
increased. The findings illustrate another, perhaps more intuitive trend: the
percentage of Guidelines sentences imposed in major white-collar cases
decreased after Booker regardless of the size of the loss amount.'7
Yet Figure 3 shows that the discrepancy in the percentage of Guidelines
sentences imposed in relatively high-loss cases versus lower-loss cases is not
explained by the rate at which non-government-sponsored below-range
sentences are imposed. Although a defendant was much more likely to receive a
non-government-sponsored below-range sentence after Booker than before,
within each time period, the likelihood that a defendant received such a
sentence was not affected by loss amount. Before Booker, a defendant was
about as likely to receive a non-government-sponsored below-range sentence
in a relatively lower-loss case as he was in a higher-loss case. The same holds
true for sentences imposed after Booker."' In other words, although defendants
were more likely to receive non-Guidelines sentences in high-loss cases, it is
not because judges were more likely to grant non-government-sponsored
departures.
Rather, as shown in Figure 4, the rate of government-sponsored below-
range sentences explains the change in rates of Guidelines sentences as loss
amount increases. Both before and after Booker, the government was markedly
more likely to sponsor a below-range sentence based on cooperation in cases
with relatively more loss attributed to the defendant than in cases with
relatively less loss.
limited by the fact that the loss amount is not available for all sentences. Consequently,
those sentences are not included in my analysis. See infra Table A3 for more information.
127. This trend is reflected in Figure 3 by the difference between the black and light gray bars.
Figure 3 also shows that the percentage of non-government-sponsored below-range
sentences increased after Booker regardless of loss amount, as reflected by the difference
between the dark gray and striped bars.
12s. This trend is reflected in Figure 3 by the dark gray and striped bars, which generally
remained constant even as the loss amount increased.
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Figure 4.
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Loss Amount Attributed to Defendant
*Pre-Booker
* Post-Booker
The government may be more likely to sponsor a below-range sentence in
cases with high loss amounts for several reasons. First, cases with extremely
high loss amounts could be more complicated, and may involve more
defendants, than relatively low-loss cases. So the government might be more
likely to need the assistance of one or more defendants, and thus seek
cooperation at higher rates. 9 But even assuming that the government is more
likely to benefit from the assistance of a cooperator in cases with higher loss
129. This explanation is only plausible if the government actually needs the cooperation of a
higher percentage of defendants in higher-loss cases than in lower-loss ones. For instance, it
could be that in less complicated, lower-loss cases, only one of three defendants in a
conspiracy might usefully contribute assistance to the government. In contrast, a more
complicated higher-loss case might result in up to five defendants of ten contributing
substantial assistance. In this example, we would expect to see a 33% government-sponsored
departure rate for the first category of cases and a 5o% rate for the second category.
However, it seems just as likely that the government would only be "substantially assisted"
by two of ten defendants in the latter category of cases, in which case the expected
substantial assistance departure rate would only be 20%. This is merely to say that it is not
necessarily true that more complicated cases involving more defendants should produce a
higher percentage of government-sponsored below-range sentences.
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amounts, it does not necessarily follow that the statistical chance of a defendant
receiving a government-sponsored below-range sentence in those cases should
be higher than a defendant's chance of receiving one in a relatively lower-loss
case.
Second, defendants in higher-loss cases may be more likely to have better
attorneys, particularly ones who have experience interacting with the U.S.
Attorney's Office and who are more effective in securing government-
sponsored departures for their clients. 0̀
Third, in higher-loss cases, the government might actually agree-
implicitly or explicitly-that the loss table enhancements overstate a
defendant's culpability. On this view, the government may be more likely to
sponsor a departure based on cooperation in higher-loss cases not because
defendants provide substantial assistance at higher rates, but because the
government is more likely to consider the Guidelines sentencing ranges in
those cases unacceptably high. That is, the government might be filing "false"
section 5Ki.1 letters-or at least be more liberal in their assessment of who
provides "substantial assistance"-in order to ensure that the defendant
receives a sentence much shorter than the Guidelines range."'
I find this last explanation exceedingly unlikely. If the government believes
the loss table enhancements produce a Guidelines sentencing range that is
unreasonable or otherwise unfairly represents the defendant's culpability, the
government has several options other than filing a "false" section 5Ki.i. First,
the prosecutor could engage in "sentencing bargaining" with the defendant,
such that the loss amount included in the presentence report-which is
produced by the probation officer and relied upon by the judge in determining
the Guidelines sentencing range - is lower, thereby resulting in a lower
Guidelines range."
130. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITrNG IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR
CIuMINALS 17-25 (1988) (explaining the factors implicitly weighed by judges in making
sentencing decisions, of which attorney effectiveness is one).
1i3. As discussed infra Section III.C, government-sponsored below-range sentences are generally
much shorter than the Guidelines sentencing range.
132. See Rakoff, supra note 26, at 8. However, "negotiating" the loss amount will not always
result in a lower Guidelines sentencing range. This is because the judge is instructed to
calculate the loss amount based on the information provided to the court in the presentence
report produced by the probation officer. Although prosecutors have ultimate authority to
decide what facts they will present to a grand jury or jury, and what amounts to include in a
charge, they cannot prevent the court from finding during sentencing that the loss
attributed to the defendant is greater than what the government suggests. The probation
officer "must conduct a presentence investigation and submit a report to the court" that,
among other things, provides the court with an advisory Guidelines sentence. FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32(c)-(d).
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The government could also explicitly or implicitly convey that it supports a
non-Guidelines sentence to the judge during sentencing. The policy of the U.S.
Attorney's Office for S.D.N.Y. apparently requires an Assistant U.S. Attorney
(AUSA) to seek permission from the Chief of the Criminal Division if she
wishes to either seek a particular sentence in a given case or request a
sentence above or below the Guidelines-calculated range."' Based on
admittedly anecdotal information, it seems that this specific permission is only
infrequently requested, though almost always granted when requested.1 4
AUSAs might also indicate implicitly to the court-without official
permission from their Office -that a below-range sentence is warranted. For
example, in United States v. Adelson,' the defendant would have received an
effective life sentence under the Guidelines due to a twenty-four-point loss
table enhancement. While the government argued officially-in accordance
with Justice Department policy-that the Guidelines sentence should be
imposed, at the sentencing hearing the AUSA "refused to answer the question






So you want Mr. Adelson to spend the rest of his
life in prison. That's your position, yes?
Your Honor, I think our position is slightly more
nuanced than that. . . . [W]e respectfully submit
that a sentence that is consistent with the terms of
the applicable [G]uidelines . . . [a]nd consistent
with other sentences in other similar cases [would
be suitable]. We think that by coupling those
two together, that would be an appropriate
reasonable -
So you think I should impose a non-[G]uideline
sentence?
Your Honor, as the Court is well aware, our policy
is that the [G]uidelines sentence is-
I don't think you can have it both ways. I think you
either have to take this position that you seem to be




Interview with Judge Richard Sullivan, S. Dist. N.Y., in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Jan. 12, 2015).
Id.
441 F. Supp. 2d So6 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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be sentenced to life imprisonment, or not. I don't
think you can wiggle out of that with this what you
call "nuanced" equivocation."
Predictably, judges do not appreciate this kind of hedging by the
government."' AUSAs act on behalf of the government and should prioritize
transparency. "8 This is all to say that, when the government believes the
Guidelines range is too high, it has multiple means to secure a below-range
sentence other than filing unwarranted section 5Ki.1 letters.
The final potential explanation for the high rate of government-sponsored
departures in higher-loss cases turns the presumed causal relationship on its
head. Rather than assuming that the government sponsors departures at
higher rates because the loss amount in those cases is higher, this explanation
suggests that the loss amount may actually be higher because the government
sponsored a departure. The U.S. Attorney's Office for S.D.N.Y. appears to
require cooperators to pay a "cooperation penalty" by expecting them to reveal,
and in most cases plead guilty to, all criminal conduct to receive the benefits of
cooperation- regardless of whether that conduct was known to the
government prior to the proffer."'9 Moreover, the defendant must disclose the
full extent of the charged scheme, including conduct or loss that the
government may not have been able to identify or prove.'40 As such, it is
possible that government-sponsored below-range sentences are common in
very high-loss cases precisely because the loss amount-and thus the
136. Id. at 511-12.
137. 'When the government officially sponsors a below-range sentence, or officially does
not object to a defendant's motion for departure, the judge indicates this in the
Statement of Reasons Form. See judgment in a Criminal Case - Statement of Reasons, U.S.
CTs., http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FormsAndFees/Forms/AO245B.pdf [http://perma
.cc/G8JQ-HZSJ]. But when the government only implicitly supports a below-range
sentence, the sentencing judge is unable to officially indicate the government's lack of
objection to the below-range sentence. As such, the Statement of Reasons Form may not
accurately reflect he circumstances urrounding the sentence imposed. Moreover, because
the Commission's data is based in part on the Statement of Reasons Form, there is no way
to know how many sentences categorized by the Commission as non-government-
sponsored below-range sentences were, in reality, below-range sentences imposed with the
support of, or at least lack of objection from, the government.
138. Moreover, if judges are on the lookout for "a wink and a nod" by prosecutors, the
government might fear that a judge will mistakenly interpret an AUSA's behavior as
suggesting implicit support of a below-range sentence. I consider this possibility remote.
139. My conversations with Judge Richard Sullivan informed my understanding of this policy.
See Interview with Judge Richard Sullivan, supra note 133. Not every U.S. Attorney's Office
employs this policy. See id.
140. Id.
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Guidelines sentencing range-is "inflated" beyond what it would have been
had the defendant not cooperated. This theory is described in more detail in
Section III.C, where I provide empirical support for the notion that this
cooperation penalty exists and inflates cooperating defendants' Guidelines
sentencing ranges.
C. Extent ofDepartures by Departure Type: Defendants Who Receive Below-
Range Sentences Derive Significant Benefits
The findings presented thus far demonstrate that judges (and prosecutors,
to the extent that they sponsor departures) frequently determine that the
Guidelines sentencing range produced in major white-collar cases is
inappropriate. But how inappropriate? It is one thing to determine that judges
find the Guidelines range too severe in many cases, but it is quite another to
determine that judges find the Guidelines range significantly too severe in many
cases. This Section considers how far "below-range" those sentences actually
are. That is, when judges impose such sentences, by how much do they depart
from the bottom end of the Guidelines sentencing range (minimum Guidelines
range)? The Commission has not released data on this point, and scholars have
yet to address this question. Empirical data concerning this issue, however, is
essential in assessing just how broken the white-collar Guidelines are -at least
in the eyes of judges who must consult them.
I evaluate two kinds of below-range sentences: (i) below-range sentences
based on cooperation with the government; and (2) non-government-
sponsored below-range sentences, imposed by the court without sponsorship
by the government. I consider them separately because these two types of
sentences are imposed for different reasons. Judges impose government-
sponsored below-range sentences to incentivize cooperation. Cooperating
defendants should receive significant departures because white-collar
defendants are exceedingly unlikely to have significant criminal histories or to
have committed violent crimes. Non-government-sponsored below-range
sentences, meanwhile, are imposed when the judge independently determines
that the Guidelines sentencing range is inappropriately high relative to the
defendant's culpability. Non-government-sponsored below-range sentences
thus reflect the judge's determination that the Guidelines-calculated sentencing
range does not accurately capture the defendant's culpability.
I reviewed and analyzed each individual government-sponsored below-
range sentence and each non-government-sponsored below-range sentence in
my dataset, and I compared the sentence that the defendant actually received
with the minimum Guidelines range. Figure 5 demonstrates that defendants
receiving either kind of departure derive great benefits.
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Figure 5.
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Year Sentence Imposed
- Below-Range: Government-Sponsored (5K1.i)
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Government-sponsored below-range sentences were consistently 90%
shorter than the minimum Guidelines range. The extent of departure for non-
government-sponsored below-range sentences was smaller, but still
significant: defendants received sentences that were, on average, fifty to
seventy percent shorter than the minimum Guidelines sentence. Figure 6
shows the same data, but with departures expressed in months rather than as a
percentage of the minimum Guidelines range."
141. The data presented in Figure 6 represents the average departure in months, based on
departure type, with life sentences removed from the dataset to avoid distortion. I removed
data for nine sentences total-three from 2008, one from 2009, two from 20o, and two
from 2012-from the set of non-government-sponsored below-range sentences. For further
information, including the data including such sentences, see infra Tables A3, A4.
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Figure 6.
EXTENT OF DEPARTURE (IN MONTHS) BY DEPARTURE TYPE
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These results suggest that judges in S.D.N.Y. frequently determine that a
departure is appropriate and, when imposing such departures, provide
defendants with significant sentencing benefits.
Consider cases in which judges imposed non-government-sponsored
below-range sentences. On average, defendants received at least a fifty-percent
departure, or more than eighteen months off their sentences. While the average
minimum Guidelines sentence in such cases ranged from about thirty to fifty
months, the average sentence actually received ranged from about fourteen
months to about twenty-six months." Recall that non-government-sponsored
below-range sentences have become increasingly common in major white-
collar cases, constituting about fifty percent of sentences in the past few
years," while government-sponsored below-range sentences routinely
comprise twenty percent of such cases. In recent years, roughly seventy percent
of defendants in major white-collar cases received a downward departure from
142. These averages do not include data from 9 life sentences, which I removed to avoid
distortion. For further information, including figures that incorporate the life sentences, see
infra Table A4.
143. See supra Figure 2.
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their Guidelines-calculated sentencing range, and those departures were, for
the most part, quite large. My findings thus demonstrate that sentencing
judges in S.D.N.Y. have not shied away from using the discretion afforded by
Booker to impose sentences significantly shorter than those produced by the
Guidelines.
Unsurprisingly, as shown in Figure s and Figure 6, the departures given to
defendants who provide substantial assistance to the government are generally
greater than those given to defendants who do not. The sentence actually
received by cooperators is on average about ninety percent shorter than the
minimum Guidelines range, or between thirty and sixty months shorter.
There are two plausible explanations for these dramatic findings. First,
some judges may simply operate under a rebuttable presumption that a white-
collar offender who provides substantial assistance to the government should
not serve much (if any) time in prison. Judges understand that the assistance
provided by cooperating defendants i invaluable to the government, and no
doubt take into consideration the fact that the vast majority of white-collar
offenders have no significant criminal history. As such, it is possible that at
least some judges nearly always impose sentences of probation, which amount
to one-hundred-percent departures, for white-collar cooperators.
The second explanation draws on the theory posited in Section III.B: that
Guidelines sentencing ranges are actually "inflated"'" in cases in which the
defendant receives a government-sponsored below-range sentence. If this is the
case, then judges must depart significantly from the minimum Guidelines
range to ensure that the defendant benefits from cooperating."s If the judge
does not depart far enough below the "inflated" Guidelines range, then the
defendant may be better off simply pleading guilty and disputing the loss
amount.
144. By "inflated" I mean that the Guidelines sentencing ranges in these cases are higher than
they would have been had the defendant not cooperated, due to the U.S. Attorney's Office
policy requiring full cooperation. For further discussion of this policy, see supra notes 139-
140 and accompanying text.
145. Consider a defendant who was a conspirator in a multidefendant fraud. If the defendant
refused to cooperate with the government and pleaded guilty, the government might not
have enough information to prove more than, say, $ioo,ooo of loss. Likewise, the probation
officer might not have enough information to include more than $1oo,ooo of loss in the
presentence report. The defendant's sentence would be calculated in part on the basis of that
loss amount. Consider, instead, that the defendant cooperated with the government and had
to provide all information related to any criminal conduct he committed. The government
might then have the information required to prove $500,ooo of loss rather than $1oo,ooo,
and the Guidelines sentencing range produced would be significantly higher. In this case, a
sentencing judge would want to make sure that the defendant receives a sentence shorter
than what he would have received, had he pleaded guilty, to ensure that defendants are
incentivized to cooperate with the government.
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This theory is plausible only if the Guidelines ranges are in fact "inflated"
compared to ranges for noncooperators. To test this theory, I calculated the
average minimum Guidelines range produced in both kinds of cases: (1) cases
where the defendant cooperated, and (2) cases where the defendant did not
cooperate but still received a below-range sentence. As shown in Figure 7, I
found that the average minimum Guidelines ranges in cases where the
defendant cooperated were consistently longer than the minimum Guidelines
ranges in cases where the defendant received a non-government-sponsored
below-range sentence.
Figure 7.










The minimum Guidelines sentencing range in cases involving cooperators
generally exceeded the range in cases with non-government-sponsored
departures.'6 Although it is possible that cases in which the defendant receives
a government-sponsored below-range sentence are, on average, more serious
than cases where the defendant receives a non-government-sponsored below-
range sentence, it seems unlikely for the reasons described in Section III.B. In
fact, given that the government often seeks cooperation from less culpable
players in order to get at the "higher-ups," we might expect defendants who
146. The average sentences reflected in Figure 7 do not include nine life sentences, which I
removed from the dataset o avoid distortion. See infra Table AS for further information.
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cooperate to be charged with less serious offenses than their noncooperating
counterparts. On this view, we would expect cooperators to receive shorter
Guidelines sentencing ranges. My findings thus suggest hat the U.S.
Attorney's Office for S.D.N.Y. implements a "cooperation penalty," which
results in the "inflation" of Guidelines sentencing ranges for cooperating
defendants. Assuming that at least some judges know of and understand this
policy,4' even a relatively harsh sentencing judge should impose sentences that
depart significantly downward from the Guidelines range in these cases to
incentivize cooperation.48 My findings demonstrate this trend: defendants
who cooperate with the government pay the "penalty" of receiving higher
Guidelines sentencing ranges than defendants who receive non-government-
sponsored departures, but in turn obtain a massive reduction of their final
sentence - receiving sentences that average around just four to nine months.49
So far, my results show two significant trends: (i) the frequency with
which below-range sentences are imposed in major white-collar cases has
continued to increase steadily, post-Booker; and (2) below-range sentences
imposed in major white-collar cases tend to be significantly shorter than the
Guidelines range. As discussed in Part IV, these results suggest that the white-
collar Guidelines in general, and the loss table in particular, are insufficient
tools for assessing defendants' culpability.
D. The Trouble with the Guidelines Is Not Unique to the Loss Table: Comparing
Major White-Collar Cases with All Cases in S.D.N. Y.
Since Booker, judges across the country have imposed non-Guidelines
sentences with increasing frequency."so But judges may be more likely to
impose non-Guidelines sentences in major white-collar cases governed by the
loss table than they are in the average case. White-collar sentencing may be less
amenable to the sort of rigid quantification embodied by the Guidelines in
general and the loss table in particular. White-collar cases are particularly
heterogeneous. Scholars have noted that "[i]t is harder to speak of a typical
bribery or securities fraud than of a typical drug deal or mail theft."I's
147. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
148. Based on my findings, I expect that the trend I identify-the existence of relatively high
minimum Guidelines-calculated sentences alongside the imposition of extraordinarily large
departures in cases involving cooperation - is unlikely to exist in districts where cooperating
defendants are not required to reveal all past criminal conduct.
149. See infra Table A5.
iso. See supra Figure 1.
151. WHEELER ET AL., supra note 130, at 18.
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Moreover, in white-collar cases more than in others, "the very existence of a
crime may be in dispute, and matters of intent and motivation are often
ambiguous."' In addition, white-collar cases "more often are subject to the
adversarial efforts of defense attorneys," which "tends to complicate rather
than simplify the classification of a case."' And in white-collar cases "judges
are usually deprived of two of the primary qualities that help the judge decide
on a sentence: a violent act and a prior record."s' These characteristics of
white-collar sentencing may make judges more likely to use the discretion
returned to them by Booker to impose sentences shorter than the Guidelines
range.
To test whether defendants in major white-collar cases are more likely to
receive below-range sentences than other defendants, I compared sentencing
trends for major white-collar cases in S.D.N.Y. with trends for all criminal
cases in S.D.N.Y. I examined the percentage of Guidelines sentences imposed,
the percentage of government-sponsored below-range sentences imposed, and
the percentage of non-government-sponsored below-range sentences imposed
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Figure 8.
COMPARISON OF SENTENCING TRENDS IN S.D.N.Y.
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Figure 8 shows that, over time, the percentage of Guidelines sentences
imposed fell dramatically, both for all crimes and for major white-collar crimes,
in S.D.N.Y. Correspondingly, the percentage of non-government-sponsored
below-range sentences increased significantly after the Court decided Booker in
2005. For almost all years, the percentage of Guidelines sentences imposed in
major white-collar cases was slightly lower than the percentage of Guidelines
sentences imposed in all crimes combined. That is, it was slightly more likely
that a defendant would receive a non-Guidelines sentence in a major white-
collar case than in the average case. However, there is no major difference
between the percentage of non-Guidelines sentences imposed in major white-
collar cases and in cases generally.
The explanation for this difference is not that major white-collar offenders
were more likely to receive non-government-sponsored below-range sentences.
They were not: those kinds of sentences were imposed in nearly the exact same
percentage of major white-collar cases as cases generally. Instead, the difference
in rates of non-Guidelines sentences appears to correspond to the difference in
government-sponsored below-range sentences: defendants in major white-
collar cases were slightly more likely than the average defendant to receive a
government-sponsored below-range sentence. But the difference is slight-
only a few percentage points per year."ss
The government's tendency to sponsor departures based on cooperation
more often in major white-collar cases relative to all criminal cases is likely the
result of several factors. First, major white-collar cases are more likely to
involve multidefendant conspiracies than, say, immigration offenses.,56 As
such, the government may be more likely to need a cooperator to prove its case.
Second, the government might be more comfortable offering the benefits of
cooperation to defendants who are unlikely to have significant criminal
histories and even less likely to have committed violent crimes. Third,
defendants themselves might be more likely to cooperate in major white-collar
cases than than in other kinds of cases. After all, a defendant who cooperates in
a major white-collar case is probably less likely to be killed for cooperating than
a defendant who cooperates in a gang-related drug conspiracy.
155. For instance, in 2007, 53% of sentences imposed in S.D.N.Y. were Guidelines sentences, as
opposed to 49% of sentences in major white-collar cases. Meanwhile, for the same year,
about 15% of defendants received government-sponsored epartures overall, while 20.5% of
major white-collar defendants received the same. See infra Table Ai.
156. One of the two Guidelines for immigration offenses -"Unlawfully Entering or Remaining
in the United States"-is unlikely to involve co-conspirators. And in the event of a
conspiracy, the government would be unlikely to need a cooperator to prove that a
defendant unlawfully entered or remained in the United States. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Li.1-.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
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The frequency with which non-government-sponsored below-range
sentences are imposed -up to roughly fifty percent of both groups of cases by
2010 - suggests that judges in S.D.N.Y. often determine that sentences
produced by the Guidelines are inappropriately high. But my findings suggest
that judges do not consider the Guidelines ranges objectionable in major
white-collar cases much more frequently than they find the Guidelines ranges
objectionable in other kinds of cases.'57 Judges often disagree with Guidelines-
calculated sentences in major white-collar cases, but there remains little
difference between trends for these crimes and for crimes generally, because
judges also frequently disagree with the Guidelines-calculated sentences in
other kinds of cases.
Consider drug crimes, which make up a significant proportion of the
docket in S.D.N.Y. s8 The Guidelines sentencing ranges for these crimes are
calculated based largely on the weight of drugs attributed to the defendant
under the drug quantity table.' 9 This calculation may overstate a drug
defendant's culpability, just as calculations under the loss table do for white-
collar defendants. Moreover, some judges believe that the Guidelines's
sentencing structure for crack cocaine is fundamentally flawed, and therefore
they routinely depart from the Guidelines in crack cases."o As a result, my
criticisms of the loss table -that it relies too heavily on numbers and produces
sentences that are too harsh-are likely generalizable to other aspects of the
Guidelines.
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
In 20o8, Stith predicted that "[t]he pendulum of sentencing practice may
increasingly swing back toward the exercise of informed discretion as newly
appointed local decision makers are able to see beyond the narrow and
157. My results only show how often judges depart from the Guidelines sentencing range in
major white-collar cases as compared to all cases generally. I make no claim about how much
judges depart from the Guidelines range when they do depart in all cases in the aggregate.
158. For instance, in fiscal year 2012, drug offenses made up 42% of the docket in S.D.N.Y., as
compared with 30.2% of the docket nationally. Statistical Information Packet: Fiscal Year 2012,
Southern District of New York, supra note 109, at 1 fig.A. In comparison, fraud offenses made
up 19.8% of the docket, about double the national average of 10.5%. Id.
59. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 21Di.(c) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2014).
16o. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 20 F. Supp. 3d 468, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that
"[w]hile, with respect to all offenses involving illegal drugs, the quantity of the drugs is, by
far, the single most important component in calculating the applicable Guidelines range, in
the case of crack cocaine, but not powder cocaine, the actual quantity is multiplied by a
factor of 18" and determining that a one:one, rather than the Guidelines' eighteen:one,
crack-to-powder-cocaine ratio should apply in calculating defendant's sentence).
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arbitrary 'frame' of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines."'' My findings suggest
that, at least in the realm of major white-collar cases in one of the most
prominent judicial districts in the country, Stith's prediction was correct.
Defendants in major white-collar cases in S.D.N.Y. are more likely than not to
receive a sentence below the Guidelines range. Moreover, when a below-range
sentence is imposed, it is generally vastly shorter than the sentence
recommended by the Guidelines. The lengthy sentences produced under the
Guidelines are rarely actually imposed, at least in S.D.N.Y. Rather, both the
government, by sponsoring below-range sentences on the basis of cooperation,
and the court, by frequently imposing below-range sentences in cases not
involving cooperation, behave in ways that mitigate the often harsh effects of
the loss table.
These results suggest that many judges believe the loss table is an
ineffective tool for measuring white-collar defendants' culpability because it
frequently and vastly overstates the seriousness of the offense. My results
further demonstrate that this critique is neither unique to a small number of
cases nor embraced by only a few judges. Prior scholarship relies on anecdotal
evidence of extraordinarily long sentences imposed in specific white-collar
cases to argue that the Commission should reconsider the white-collar
Guidelines.' My findings provide comprehensive empirical evidence that the
white-collar Guidelines are broken: the results indicate widespread judicial
refusal to impose the sentences produced under those Guidelines. The fact that
my findings pertain to a district in which judges have significant experience
sentencing in major white-collar cases reinforces the conclusion that these
Guidelines are flawed.t6 3
The Guidelines are merely advisory. But as long as they remain the
"starting point" in every sentencing, the quality and fairness of the Guidelines
161. Stith, supra note 67, at 1420.
162. For instance, Andrew Weissmann and Joshua Block argue that the extraordinarily high
sentences imposed on some corporate executives should "cause the Sentencing Commission
and Congress to rethink the fraud Guidelines." Weissmann & Block, supra note 33, at 291.
163. One might respond that my findings-rather than supporting the notion that the
white-collar Guidelines are flawed and should be amended-support the notion that
the problem is with the judges. This argument is unpersuasive. The S.D.N.Y. bench
is well regarded and includes judges appointed by both Republican and Democratic
presidents, including many former prosecutors. Moreover, if anyone should believe that
judges in S.D.N.Y. have gone rogue, it should be the U.S. Attorney's Office. Yet the
government almost never appeals sentences in S.D.N.Y. See, e.g., Disposition of Government
Sentencing Appeals in Each Circuit and District, Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION
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still matters.64 Moreover, there is reason to believe that the Guidelines have an
"anchoring effect" on judges such that - regardless of the Guidelines's advisory
status - many judges will continue to impose sentences within or close to the
Guidelines range regardless of whether that range satisfies Congress's directive
to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with" the purposes of sentencing. 6s Even if this anchoring effect does not exert
much influence on judges in S.D.N.Y. in high-loss white-collar cases, it may
influence judges elsewhere."6 In particular, judges with less experience
sentencing in these kinds of cases might reasonably rely more heavily on the
Guidelines anchor. As such, it remains essential that the "anchor" not produce
sentences that are arbitrary or too severe.
A. Proposal One: Reduce the Severity of the Loss Table's Enhancements and Add
an Enhancement to Section 2B1.1 Based on the Defendant's Own Pecuniary
Gain
Congress and the Commission should reconsider and amend the white-
collar Guidelines. I propose a series of amendments that would provide a more
nuanced and accurate assessment of white-collar defendants' culpability. First,
the Commission should propose an amendment'6 ' reducing the severity of the
loss table enhancements. The loss table currently provides for enhancements
ranging between two and thirty levels. As a result, where the loss amount
attributed to the defendant is even moderately high, that loss amount will be
by far the most significant contributor to the resulting Guidelines sentencing
range, dwarfing other arguably more relevant factors including the defendant's
role in the offense, the effect of the defendant's conduct on victims, and-for
defendants sentenced on the basis of intended loss -the actual financial harm
caused by the offense. Moreover, the pure severity of these enhancements is
164. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
16S. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
166. Although my findings show that many judges feel free to impose sentences below the
Guidelines range in major white-collar cases, there may in fact be an "anchoring effect" even
in S.D.N.Y. That is, if the Guidelines produced shorter sentencing ranges, it may be that the
sentences actually imposed would be even shorter than they are now. Regardless of whether
judges impose a sentence inside or outside the Guidelines range, that benchmark may well
influence the actual sentence imposed.
167. Each year the Commission publishes proposed amendments, holds a period of notice and
public comment, and then promulgates final amendments. Those amendments become
effective automatically after November 1 of each year, unless Congress affirmatively
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disproportionate to the harm caused by most white-collar crimes.
Section 3553(a) requires the court to impose a sentence "sufficient, but not
greater than necessary,"16 8 to comply with the goals of sentencing, yet the loss
table can provide for what amounts to a sentence of life in prison where the
loss amount is high enough-even for first-time offenders. As my results
suggest, the sentencing ranges produced as a result of loss table enhancements
are out of step with judicial, and likely societal, notions of justice. The
Commission should thus reduce the enhancements uch that they range from
one to fifteen levels, rather than from two to thirty levels.169
Second, the Commission should add an enhancement increasing a
defendant's offense level based on the amount of pecuniary gain he received as
a result of the offense. To avoid the exact problem I identify throughout this
Note with the current white-collar Guidelines - that they often produce
sentencing ranges that are unduly harsh - this new enhancement should be less
severe than those provided by the loss table. Likewise, the change should not
be made unless in conjunction with an amendment reducing the severity of the
loss table enhancements. The current Guidelines instruct the court to "use the
gain that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if
there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined."' The Commission's
justification is that basing the sentence on gain rather than loss would
ordinarily underestimate the loss and, consequently, the defendant's
culpability."' Under my proposal, the enhancement based on gain would
supplement the amount of loss attributed to the defendant under the less
severe loss table. This enhancement, in conjunction with my first proposal,
better captures the defendant's true culpability. Defendants with significant
roles in an offense are likely to have derived significant economic benefits,
while low-level players are likely to have benefited only minimally.
Accordingly, defendants with the greatest culpability -those whose conduct
results in significant financial harm from which the defendant benefits
directly-would be punished severely, since they would be subject to both the
168. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
169. See also David Debold & Matthew Benjamin, "Losing Ground"- in Search of a Remedy for the
Overemphasis on Loss and Other Culpability Factors in the Sentencing Guidelines for Fraud and
Theft, 16o U. PA. L. REV. PENNuMBRA 141, 154-55 (2011) (proposing ways to amend the loss
table so that the amount of loss has "less significant sentencing input").
170. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 211.1 cmt. n.3(B) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2014).
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loss table enhancements and this separate enhancement."' Meanwhile,
defendants who gain little or nothing through minimal participation in a
fraudulent scheme would be subject only to the loss table enhancements, which
would be significantly less harsh under my first proposal.173
B. Proposal Two: Apply Loss Table Enhancements Only to Actual Loss
Finally, the loss table enhancements hould apply only to losses that have
actually accrued, and not to intended loss. In most other areas of criminal law,
we punish those who merely attempt to cause a particular harm differently
than those who actually accomplish that harm. For example, the Guidelines
provide for a base offense level of forty-three for first-degree murder, while the
base offense level for attempted first-degree murder is thirty-three.74 And in
insider-trading cases, the Guidelines provide for sentencing enhancements on
the basis of the gain resulting from the offense rather than losses caused or
intended to be caused.'7s While there is significant disagreement over how to
calculate the gain resulting from the offense in the insider-trading context, , 6
defendants' sentences are based on some measure of actual gain, not intended
gain. In punishing attempted harm less harshly than actual harm, we recognize
that the blameworthiness of the defendant's frame of mind affects, but is not
determinative of, how harshly he should be punished; we must also consider
172. Adding a separate enhancement based on individual pecuniary gain would sometimes result
in "double counting." For instance, if a defendant defrauds an individual out of $1oo,ooo
and pockets that entire amount, he will be punished under the loss table for the $ioo,ooo
loss and also receive an enhancement based on the $ioo,ooo gain. Double counting in this
situation is appropriate in order to account for the separate harms associated with the loss to
the individual -a harm that exists no matter where the money ends up -and with the gain
to the defendant.
173. See Debold & Benjamin, supra note 169, at 155 (proposing that "the amount of
the defendant's pecuniary gain should be a more consequential sentencing input");
Letter from Thomas M. Susman, Dir., Gov't Affairs Office, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Patti B. Saris,
Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 1-2 (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files
/pdf/amendment-process/public-comment/2ono826/Susman-ABA~pubconpriorities.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XH38-U59J] (proposing a similar change).
174. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 2Ai.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMA4'N 2014),
with id. § 2A2.i.
175. Id. § 2B1.4 (b).
176. See, e.g., Danielle DeMasi Chattin, Note, The More You Gain, the More You Lose: Sentencing
Insider Trading Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 165, 196-215 (2011)
(discussing various methods applied by circuit courts to calculate gain in insider-trading
cases and proposing restructuring the economic crime Guidelines to deemphasize monetary
figures altogether).
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the harm caused to society and to the defendant's victims." Intuitively, it
makes little sense to apply the same enhancement o someone whose fraud
results in the loss of a million dollars of victims' savings as we would to
someone who attempts (and fails) to sell the Brooklyn Bridge for a million
dollars.' 8 Accordingly, loss table enhancements should apply only to actual
losses: the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the
offense. To capture the additional culpability of a defendant who intends more
financial harm than he actually causes, the Commission should propose an
additional - but less severe - enhancement hat would apply to losses in excess
of those that actually accrue.
In sum, my proposals would work together as follows. First, the
Commission should amend the loss table to reduce the severity of its
enhancements. Second, the Commission should redefine "loss" such that only
actual losses qualify for loss table enhancements. Third, the Commission
should propose two new enhancements to section 2B1.1-one based on the
defendant's own pecuniary gain, and another that applies when a defendant
sought to inflict more loss than actually resulted.
The proposals outlined above are admittedly imperfect, since they still rely
on the sort of quantification that makes the loss table -and the Guidelines
more generally- suspect to begin with.`9 in particular, even if enhancements
177. For instance, in explaining the 2015 Amendment, which specifies that "intended loss" covers
only the pecuniary harm that "the defendant purposely sought to inflict," the Commission
stated: "The amendment reflects the Commission's continued belief that intended loss is an
important factor in economic crime offenses, but also recognizes that sentencing
enhancements predicated on intended loss, rather than losses that have actually accrued,
should focus more specifically on the defendant's culpability." U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION,
supra note 35, at 25.
178. Although the 2015 Amendments clarify that the calculation of intended loss should only
include the amount of harm that the defendant purposely intends to cause, this amendment
does not go far enough in recognizing the difference in culpability between a defendant who
causes actual loss and one who does not. Even under the amended definition of intended
loss, as long as the defendant intends to cause a particular amount of pecuniary harm-
regardless of whether that loss is "improbable or impossible" -he will be punished under
the loss table just as severely as if he had actually caused such losses. See id. at 29.
179. Judge Rakoff proposes eliminating the Guidelines altogether and replacing them with a
nonbinding, nonarithmetic multifactor test for this exact reason. See Rakoff, supra note 26,
at 6. Wes Reber Porter proposes a sort of middle ground between Judge Rakoffs proposal
and the status quo: maintaining the "structure, organization, and considerations of the
Guidelines," but doing away with "the distracting and misleading numbers and calculations
that accompany the Guidelines." Wes Reber Porter, Federal Judges Need Competing
Information To Rival the Misleading Guidelines at Sentencing, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 28, 30
(2013). I see value in both of these proposals insofar as they direct the judge's discretion
without saddling her "with arbitrary weights and measures." See Rakoff, supra note 26, at 9.
But the likelihood of such sweeping change occurring anytime soon is slim. In the
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are less severe, at the high end of the loss table those enhancements will still
dwarf other relevant considerations, such as the defendant's role in the offense.
And although my proposals provide a more nuanced way to assess culpability,
they still risk producing overly harsh sentences by increasing the number of
enhancements that could apply in a given case. Still, reducing the severity of
the enhancements, in conjunction with redefining the loss attributable to the
defendant, could go a long way toward improving the white-collar Guidelines.
CONCLUSION
Judges should give little weight to the Guidelines ranges produced under
the loss table in white-collar cases. It is true that disregard for the Guidelines
could-and probably will-produce interjudge and interdistrict disparities in
sentencing. But as Judge Robert Hinkle argued:
It is better to have five good sentences and five bad ones than to have
ten bad but consistent sentences. And it would be better still to have ten
good sentences - even if they could be explained only as the considered
judgment of a good and honest and experienced district judge whose
goal was to get it right, and even if that explanation could not be fit into
the grids on a guideline chart.xao
The fact of difference in sentencing trends between judges or between
districts does not mean that unwarranted disparities exist. For instance, my
results show that defendants who cooperate in major white-collar cases receive
drastically shorter sentences than the range produced by the Guidelines.
However, my results also suggest that this phenomenon can be explained at
least in part by the fact that the U.S. Attorney's Office imposes a "cooperation
penalty" on defendants that artificially inflates the Guidelines sentencing
range. If prosecutors in other districts do not impose such a "cooperation
penalty," we might find that departures for cooperating defendants in those
districts are much smaller than they are in S.D.N.Y. This would constitute a
"disparity," but not necessarily an unwarranted one: the difference would
simply reflect differences in local prosecutorial practices.
meantime, my more pragmatic potential solution would be an improvement over the status
quo.
iso. Robert L. Hinkle, Dist. Judge, Statement Before the United States Sentencing Commission
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To the extent we are concerned about unwarranted disparities in
sentencing, this concern militates in favor of amending the white-collar
Guidelines. Because the anchoring effect of the Guidelines may be stronger in
districts where judges see major white-collar cases infrequently, sentences
imposed there might be significantly longer on average. Anecdotal evidence
suggests this is the case. Mark Harris and colleagues note that "one cannot
shake the feeling that an invisible ceiling that formerly blocked off the upper
reaches of the Guidelines table has now been breached."'' "Sentences
measured in multiple decades," they explain, are now "dispensed on a daily
basis."' But with one exception, the cases on which they rely come from
judicial districts where major white-collar prosecutions are relatively rare.'8 , If
the harsh sentences produced by the white-collar Guidelines are rarely imposed
in practice, except on the unlucky offenders who are prosecuted in districts
with few major white-collar cases, then reforming the Guidelines is even more
urgent. To create a more comprehensive picture of post-Booker sentencing in
major white-collar cases, and to probe the question of unwarranted disparities
in sentencing, further empirical research should be conducted using data from
other judicial districts throughout the country, including districts with
relatively few such cases.
By chaining the defendant's offense level to the amount of loss attributed to
him-and by defining "loss" extraordinarily broadly-the Guidelines can
produce decades-long sentences even in cases where the defendant's role was
minor or the economic harm caused was minimal or nonexistent-as Olis's
original sentence made clear.'8' The same characteristic that makes the loss
table a bad tool for approximating culpability-its heavy reliance on a
181. Mark D. Harris et al., The Current State of White-Collar Sentencing, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 1, 1
(2013).
18z. Id. at 1-2.
183. See i4. at 1-2, 2 n.3 (2013) (providing as examples a twenty-three-year sentence imposed in
the Northern District of Texas; a twenty-year sentence imposed in the Middle District of
Florida; a twenty-seven-year sentence imposed in the Northern District of Iowa; and a fifty-
year sentence also imposed in the Northern District of Iowa). In 2012, there were only 131
fraud prosecutions in the Northern District of Texas, compared to 304 in S.D.N.Y. Compare
Statistical Information Packet, Fiscal Year 2012: Northern District of Texas, U.S. SENT'G
COMMIssION 2 tbl.1 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/data-and-statistics
/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2o12/txnl2.pdf [http://perma.cc/HR35
-34VP], with Statistical Information Packet, Fiscal Year 2012: Southern District of New York,
supra note 109, at 2 tbl.i. In the same year, there were twenty-five fraud prosecutions in the
Northern District of Iowa. See Statistical Information Packet, Fiscal Year 2012: Northern District
ofIowa, U.S. SENT'G COMMISSION 2 tbl.i (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf
/data-and-statistics/federal-sentencing-statistics/state-district-circuit/2o12/ianl2.pdf [http://
perma.cc/XU96-YN2R].
184. See Olis I, 429 F.3d 54o, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2005).
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quantifiable metric as the primary proxy for seriousness of the offense-
plagues other parts of the Guidelines system.s' Indeed, my results show that
judges in S.D.N.Y. do not consider the white-collar Guidelines uniquely
problematic.186
Using a detailed chart - no matter how complex - will not always produce
sentences "sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with" the
purposes of sentencing.'8 ' My findings suggest that the sentencing ranges
produced by the Guidelines in major white-collar cases often conflict with this
statutory directive. Although the Court in Booker and its progeny returned
significant sentencing discretion to judges, the Guidelines remain the "starting
point" in every sentencing. Until they are amended to capture more accurately
the concept of culpability, Congress and the Commission should not be
surprised that judges often conclude that the Guidelines's "starting point"
should not serve as the endpoint in sentencing.
iss. For instance, the drug quantity table uses the type and quantity of a drug as a proxy for
culpability. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 2Di.a(c) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N 2014).
186. See supra Figure 8.
187. 18 U.S.C. 5 3553(a) (2012).
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APPENDIXs
Table Ai.
TYPES OF SENTENCES IMPOSED IN ALL CRIMES AND MAJOR WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMES
Government- Non-Government-
Guidelines Sentence Sponsored Below- Sponsored
Range (5K1.1) Below- Range
All Major All Major All MajoraWhite- White-
Crimes White-Collar Crimes Collar Crimes Collar
2002 74.5% 68.1% 15.9% 21.9% 9.3% 1o.o%
2o0 3  78.4 71.5 13.0 18.o 8.3 10.5
2004 76.6 71.0 14.2 18.8 8.1 10.3
2005 59.9 50.2 13.6 21.3 24.2 27.6
20o6 58.2 53.3 13.5 20.7 26.1 25.2
2007 53.0 49.2 15.3 20.5 29.4 28.6
20o8 44.4 34.0 17.9 26.2 35.o 39.3
2009 42.6 37.8 14.2 18.9 40.4 43.0
2010 32.6 27.4 15.9 22.0 1 49.0 50.2
o1 34.9 35.5 14-4 13.o 49.0 50.4
2012 33.5 30.4 16.1 22.1 47.6 46.4
All data for "all crimes" comes directly from the Sentencing Commission. For data on "major white-
collar" crimes: For the year 2002, there were 224 Guidelines sentences; 72 government-sponsored below-
range sentences; and 33 non-government-sponsored below-range sentences. For 2003, in the same order,
there were 191, 5o, and 30 sentences respectively. For 2004, there were 197, 5o, and 26 sentences
respectively. For 2005 (post-Booker), there were iii Guidelines sentences; 46 government-sponsored
below-range sentences; and 61 non-government-sponsored below-range sentences. For 2oo6 in the same
order, there were 129, 5o, and 72 sentences respectively. For 2007 in the same order, there were 115, 48,
and 67 sentences respectively. For 2oo8 in the same order, there were 83, 64, and 96 sentences
respectively. For 2009 in the same order, there were 94, 47, and 107 sentences respectively. For 2oo in the
same order, there were 71, 57, and 130 sentences respectively. For 2011 in the same order, there were 98,
36, and 139 sentences respectively. For 2012 in the same order, there were 85, 62, and 130 sentences
respectively.
io68
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Table A2.
TYPES OF SENTENCES IMPOSED IN MAJOR WHITE-COLLAR CRIMES
Guidelines Sentence Government-Sponsored Non-Government-
Imposed Below-Range Sponsored
(5Ki. 1) Below-Range
2002 68.1% 21.9% 10.0%
2003 71.5 i8.o 10.5
2004 71 18.8 10.3
2005 50.2 21.3 27.6
20o6 53-3 20.7 25.2
2007 49.2 20.5 28.6
20o8 34.0 26.2 39.3
2009 37.8 18.9 43.0
2010 27.4 22.0 50.2
2011 35-5 13.0 50.4
2012 30.4 22.1 46.4
For information regarding the number of sentences included in each category, see the note accompanying
TableAl. Sentences imposed in other categories-such as above-Guidelines entences-are omitted.
Table A3-
TYPES OF SENTENCES IMPOSED BY LOSS AMOUNT
Government- Non-Government-
Guidelines Sentence Sponsored Below- Sponsored Below-
Range (5Ki.1) Range
Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post-
Booker Booker Booker Booker Booker Booker
$3oK- 72% 44.2% 16.5% 16.2% 10.o% 38.7%
20oK (N= 244) (N= 180) (N= 56) (N= 66) (N= 34) (N= 185)
$2ooK- 69.8% 37-5% 18-7/0 24.4% 8.2% 37.5%
xM (127) (13s) (34) (88) (15) (135)
$iM- 58.8% 32.1% 24.4% 28.6% 13.7% 38-1%
20M (77) (81) (32) (72) (18) (96)
$2oM 22.2% 15.5% 61.1% 41.4% 11.1% 39.7%
and up (4) (9) (11) (24) (2) (23)
In addition to the data included above, there were several sentences that I could not account for in my
analysis regarding loss because the loss amount was not included in the dataset. There were 99 such
sentences in 2002; 72 in 2003; 49 1n 2004; 90 in 2oo5; 112 in 2oo6; 87 in 2007; 84 in 2oo8; 131 in 2oo9;
123 in 2010; 147 in 2o11; and 15o in 2012. It is impossible to say how having the loss amount data for
these cases would have affected my findings. Depending on what the real loss amounts for these cases were,
the omission of these sentences might not have had much of an effect on my findings. That is, if the
omitted cases were generally spread out across loss amounts, then including them in the data analysis
would not have had much effect at all. Sentences imposed in other categories-such as above-Guidelines
sentences -are omitted.
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Table A4.
AVERAGE EXTENT OF DEPARTURE AND AVERAGE MINIMUM GUIDELINES
SENTENCING RANGE BY TYPE OF SENTENCE IMPOSED
Average Extent ofDeparture Average Minimum Sentencing
(in Months) Range
Non-Government-Non-Government-
Government- Sponsored Below-Range Government- i Sponsored
Sponsored Sponsored Below-Range
Belo-Rage Wthot ;WithoutBelow-Range With Life  Itut Below-Range With Life
(N = 410) Sentences nt (N = 410) Sentences Senteces(N = 799) Sentences(N=79 Setns(N= 799) (N= 79o) (N 799) = 79)
2ooS 42.0 21.7 21,7 49-3 47.3 47-3(N= 46) (N= 59) (N= 59) (N= 46) (N= sq) (N= 59)
2oo6 59-5 21.9 21.9 50.8 31.2 31.2
(5o) (71) (71) (50) (71) (71)
37.0 15.0 15.0 44.6 30.1 30.12007 (48) (67) (67) (48) (67) (67)
30.1 67.5 17.5* 373 88.9 33.8*2008 (64) (96) (93) (64) i (96) (93)
2oo 40.5 29.7 15.9* 49.4 53*6 37-7*
9 (47) (107) (to6) (47) (107) (xo6)
2010 39-3 39-9 25.5* 428 63.6 48.7*
(57) (130) (128) (57) (130) (128)
2011 42.0 31-3 15.8* 46.o 62.4 41.5*
(36) (139) (138) (36) (139) (138)
45.4 29.4 19.2 1 50.2 513 4~*2945* 51.3 40.0*
2012 4. 92.(62) (130) (128) (62) (13o) (128)
*These figures represent the average departure in months for court-sponsored epartures with life
sentences removed from the dataset. Three life sentences were removed from 2oo8; one from 2009; two
from 2olo; one from 2o11; and two from 2012. When compared with the corresponding figures in Table
A4, it is clear that the few life sentences included in the data in Table A4 greatly distorted the average (for
e.g., the average departure for ninety-six non-government-sponsored below-range sentences in 2oo8 was
67-5 months, but after removing only three of those sentences, the average dropped to 17.5 months).




FIFTY SHADES OF GRAY: SENTENCING TRENDS IN MAJOR WHITE-COLLAR CASES
Table A5.
AVERAGE SENTENCES RECEIVED (IN MONTHS)
No Departure Government-Sponsored Non-Government-
(N = 786) Below-Range Sponsored Below-Range
(N = 410) (N = 790)
2005 25.2 7.8 25.6
20o6 25.9 5.7 13.6
2007 35 7.6 15.2
20o8 43.9 7-3 21.5/16.2*
2009 37.4 9.1 23.8/21.8*
2010 53-2 3.5 23-7/23.7*
2011 46.4 4.0 28.9/25.6*
2012 28.1 4.8 22/20.7*
*Figures marked with an asterisk reflect the average non-government-sponsored below-range sentences
with life sentences removed from the datasets. Three lfe sentences were removed from 2008, one from
2009, two from 2olo, one from 2011, and two from 2012.
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